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Abstract 
 
The American University in Cairo 
Thesis title: The Role of the Hawza of Najaf and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in 
Restructuring the Iraqi Governance System in Post-Ba‘athist Iraq 
Student: Fadel Reda Al-Kifaee 
Supervisor: Dr. Jennifer Bremer  
 
The role of the Shi'i religious establishment in the Iraqi transition since 2003 has 
been the subject of considerable research. To have clearer insight, the present research 
places this topic within the context of two critical frameworks: the doctrinal and 
structural aspect of the jurist's guardianship and the religious-political potentials of the 
conflict between the Iranian walayat al-faqih and Ayatollah al-Sistani's neo-quietist 
approach. In addition, it sheds light on al-Sistani's influence over three areas: the 
constitution-making process, rule of law, and the issue of having clerics running in 
elections. The analysis presented in this paper examines how this Ayatollah's views 
could affect the ideology and practice of Iraqi Shi'i political movements regarding the 
role of religion in the state. It analyses the role of the religious networks in shaping 
the prospective outcomes of this hidden dispute between the Iranian Supreme Leader, 
Ali Khamenei, and the Shi'i supreme marja', Ali al-Sistani. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Summary of the Analysis  
This research is intended to shed light on the Shi'i religious establishment in Iraq, 
called Hawza, as per its influence over the process of restructuring the governance 
system in the country since the US-led invasion in 2003 and focus particularly in the 
period 2003-2005 in which the political framework had been set up. Because the topic 
is likely to be new to many non-Shi'i readers, and maybe to some Shi'is as well, the 
present research will encompass a relatively elaborate review of three major areas; the 
Shi'i doctrinal principles related to state and governance, the structures and functions 
of the Hawza, and the role of the Shi'i seminary in Iraqi modern history.  
In chapter two, the research will examine the doctrinal and structural aspects of 
Shi'ism concerning the relationship between the state and the clergy. Actually, 
adopting the principle of the divine designation of the Prophet's successors by the 
Shi'a has led to a vacuum in leadership legitimacy after the disappearance of the 
twelfth Imam, al-Mahdi. The Shi'i jurists were divided over this issue into two groups: 
firstly, those who believe that the guardianship of the Hidden Imam cannot be 
extended to jurists specifically his political authorities and, secondly, the group which 
believes that jurists, with specific competencies, can, or must, practice some, or all, 
aspects of this absolute guardianship. The latter's theory is relatively new in the Shi'i 
doctrine although it has roots in the Shi'i jurisprudence because it was firstly 
developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in early 1970s. 
The Hawza of Najaf is the oldest one in the Shi'a Islam. Through time, it 
developed a religious and academic hierarchy according to which the seminary and 
the related institutions operate. The supremacy of this Hawza in the Shi'i world has 
not been consistent as it lost the leading status several time to other seminaries in Iraq, 
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such as Karbala and Hilla, or Iran, such as Isfahan and Qum. This had been mainly 
caused by the conflict between the Ottomans and the Safavids, or the Qajaris 
subsequently.  
The most distinction feature of Najaf Hawza and Shi'i seminaries generally, is its 
financial independence from the state due to the revenues of Khums, the Shi'i 
religious tax. 
The political role of Najaf Hawza in Iraq will be discussed and analyzed in 
Chapter three. The Hawza of Najaf played a central role in the 1920 revolution 
against the British in which few Grand Ayatollahs formed a trans-sectarian alliance 
with Sunni and Shi'i tribesmen. The subsequent Hashemite Kingdom established in 
Iraq had witness marginalizing the Shi'i Hawza, and the Shi'a in general, as the 
emerging Sunni elite sought to preserve their control over the new state. This situation 
had been worsened by the rejectionist approach that adopted by some Ayatollahs 
toward establishing the newborn state's institutions by the British. This jeopardized 
having the Shi'is integrated in the Iraqi society and led to the conflict between the two 
parties, Iraqi Shi'is and the government in 1935.  
As late as the monarchical era, many Shi'i political organizations have been 
founded and many of them were led, supervised, or affiliated to some Najaf jurists. 
The young Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was the most distinguished 
jurist in this regard. He was the Da'wa Party's jurist and believed on a kind of walayat 
al-faqih differing from that of Ayatollah Khomeini. 
The emergence of the absolute guardianship of the jurist in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran and the mass oppressive campaign against the activist Shi'is in Iraq by the 
regime of Ba'ath along with the Iraqi-Iranian war had contributed to the decline of 
Najaf status and the rise of Qum. In addition, these factors put pressures on the Iraqi 
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Shi'i movements, which sought refuge in Iran, to adopt the Khomeini style of 
governance that led some organization to split over the issue. 
Najaf Hawza's supremacy tends to be restored in post-2003 Iraq due to the 
emergence of Ayatollah al-Sistani who has the largest number of followers in the Shi'i 
world. Besides, the Hawza of Qum is loosing its dependency as the Iranian regime 
succeeded in politicizing all its aspects a matter that limited the Ayatollahs' spiritual 
leadership. Consequently, more Shi'i political organizations is following, at least 
politically, the approach of al-Sistani regarding abandoning the aim of the Islamic 
State based on the absolute guardianship of the jurist. 
After establishing a reasonable relevant knowledge in Chapter 2 and 3, the paper 
will focus in Chapter 4 on examining the role of Ayatollah al-Sistani in the post-
invasion era concerning setting the democratic framework in Iraq. In addition, it will 
examine the relationship between the clergy and the Shi'i political organizations and 
whether these connections are contributing to transform these organizations' 
manifestos regarding the role of Islam in state. Al-Sistani emerged as the supreme 
marja in Najaf gradually in the 1990s out of complex circumstances in which three 
prominent Grand Ayatollahs were assassinated and many accused Saddam's regime of 
the crimes. In the postwar era, al-Sistani has promoted his marji'iya through acting as 
the non-sectarian defender of the Iraqi national interests. The tone of his fatwas 
regarding the political process avoided any implicit or explicit sectarian indication.  
The period from the invasion in 2003 until the ratification of the Constitution in 
the late 2005 witnessed most of his interventions. This stage witnessed a conflict of 
wills between the most two significant players in Iraq then; the US-led authority, the 
CPA and al-Sistani. While al-Sistani won in forcing the CPA to abandon the plan of 
writing the constitution by a non-elected council, the CPA managed to transfer some 
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principles from the TAL into the permanent constitution. After approving the 
constitution, al-Sistani's political fatwas substantially decreased.  
Some scholars consider al-Sistani's approach regarding the jurist's guardianship is 
basically concerned with the societal system more than political affairs. His relative 
withdrawal from the political arena after 2005 may indicate a return to the 
conventional method of the 'occasional interventions' that was practiced by many 
prominent marjas in the past.  
The last chapter of this paper is a two-part analysis. The first section uses three 
case studies to examine the influence of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani over the Iraqi 
transition. Those three areas are constitution-making process, rule of law, and clerics 
as candidates in elections. The section highlights the inconsistent influence of the 
Ayatollah. Whereas his influence was decisive in abandoning the caucus system in 
forming the constitutional assembly, for instance, the impact of his positions 
regarding signing the Agreement of Political Process and issuing the Transitional 
Administrative Law were relatively ineffective. The second section of Chapter Five 
represents an analysis of the prospects of the conflict between the neo-quietist 
approach of al-Sistani and walayat al-faqih of the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei. 
The outcomes of this conflict depend on many factors such as the strength and 
sustainability of al-Sistani‘s religious network and that of al-Khoei Foundation, the 
health of al-Sistani himself, and the potential transformations of the Shi‘i political 
parties regarding walayat al-faqih. Post-al-Sistani era is also examined in that context.  
 Along with this explanatory review, the research will try to address the 
developments of the principle of jurist's guardianship that falls in the center of the 
relationship between jurists and state. In addition, it will explore the relationships and 
competition between the two prominent Hawzas of Najaf and Qum, how this has 
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affected the political orientations of Najaf clerics in general and those of Ayatollah 
Sistani in particular, and how these effects have in turn impacted the Shi‘i and Iraqi 
political developments.  
Hence, the research question for the present research is: 
What is the role of the Hawza of Najaf and Ayatollah al-Sistani on 
restructuring the Iraqi governance system in post-Baathis Iraq? 
The role of religion in governance 
In establishing and maintaining governance systems in the Middle East, religious 
actors have exerted significant influence. The region consists, mainly, of Muslim 
Majority States (MMS) and has experienced considerable influence by Islamic 
personalities and organizations over state structures and functions. Along with the 
emergence of political Islamism within the Sunni doctrine during the twentieth 
century, Shi'i doctrine has witnessed substantial developments in the relation between 
the state and the umma, literally the nation, and between the state and the clergy. The 
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 represented a peak in these 
developments and has led scholars to conduct extensive academic work to research its 
causes and effects.  Less attention has been paid to the role of Iraq-based Ayatollahs 
in governance systems.  
Post-2003 Iraq has provided a new and special context in which the Hawza, the 
Shi'i learning center, of Najaf has played vital roles in public policy-making and 
politics.  Its role in the period following the US-led invasion reflected the activist 
approach that it had practiced in the last century. Among the clerics of Najaf, Grand 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani stands as one of the most, if not the most, influential Islamic 
figures in post-Saddam Iraq (Beeman, 2003). His positions, fatwas, announcements, 
and opinions have been of considerable importance to the country's politics. 
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Disregarding the special sociopolitical conditions of Iraq, a study of Sistani's 
interventions in establishing the Iraqi governance system would provide an important 
contribution to improve our knowledge regarding how Islam, particularly Shi'ism, can 
shape states and governance in the Middle East. 
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Chapter Two 
The Structures and Functions of the Hawza of Najaf 
 
The Hawza represents the religious establishment in the Shi'i Islam equivalent to 
the Azhar in the Sunna Islam though with some distinctions. The first Hawza was 
established in Najaf, Iraq, in the eleventh century and still operates. Unlike the Azhar, 
the Hawza, in general, has managed to preserve its independency from the state due to 
several factors that will be explained shortly. However, the emergence of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has impacted the independency of the Iranian Hawzas. To 
understand how the Hawza operates, how the supreme jurist emerges, and, more 
importantly, how the Hawza interacts with governments, the Shi'i doctrine will be 
described before proceeding to survey its structure, leadership, and finance. 
 
The State in Shi'i Doctrine  
The relation with the ruler is positioned in the center of the Shi'i doctrine because 
the sect was established based on a political dispute over the legitimate Caliph after 
the demise of Prophet Muhammad in 11 A.H., 632 CE (Farzaneh, 2008). Some of the 
Prophet's companions asserted that Ali Bin Abi Talib, Muhammad's cousin and son-
in-law, was designated to be his successor in Hajjat al-Wadaa', literally the last 
pilgrimage, in Ghadir Khum, which the Prophet pursued a few months before his 
demise. This group of companions was called, later on, 'the Shi'a of Ali' and the word 
Shi'a means the followers or partisans (el-Labbad, 2008, 19). Hence, many scholars 
argue that Shi'ism is initially a political movement more than a theological creed: 
The fact that Ali did not succeed the Prophet after his death, and was [later on] 
faced with the Umayyad rebellion questioning the legitimacy of his rule, served 
to formalize the schism in Islam… Shiism is essentially a political movement 
both in its perspectives and aims. The religious theological differences between 
the Shii school of thought and those of Orthodox Islam [Sunnism] are minor, and 
will be totally ignored except for one major issue which has served as the 
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fundamental basis of the movement ever since its inception in the first century of 
Islam. (Kelidar, 1983) 
Accordingly, the Shi'a School advocates the principle of Imama, and therefore 
they are called Imamiya, which means that a legitimate Caliph should be designated 
by God or the Prophet (Kelidar, 1983). Thus, the mainstream of Shi'a Islam believes 
that the Prophet designated twelve Imams, beginning with his cousin Ali and ending 
with Imam al-Mahdi, to be his successors; hence those Shi'is are called the Twelvers 
to distinguish them from the other Shi'i creeds like the Zaidiya concentrated in 
Yemen. In contrast, the initial Sunni theory of Caliphate is based on two means of 
succession: i) the Shoura principle, which means making consultations among ahl 
elhal wa al-aqd
1
 to choose the caliph, and ii) assuming power by force. (El-Sousi et 
al, 2005). 
Adopting the principle of divine designation led Shi'a to extend the guardianship 
of the Prophet over Muslim communities to the twelve Imams, while Sunnis believe 
that such a guardianship had been transferred to the caliphs (Akhavi, 1996) and then 
extended, in modern history, to any Muslim ruler assuming the power. The twelfth 
Imam, Muhammad Ibn al-Hassan, disappeared in mysterious circumstances in 873 
and the Shi'is believe that he will reappear one day to spread justice and peace 
worldwide. They call him the Hidden Imam and designate the time since his 
disappearance as the Major Occultation, al-ghayba al-kubra. This occultation left a 
substantial vacuum in Shi'i jurisprudence regarding the rulers‘ legitimacy and the 
divine guardianship. Most of the Shi'i clerics have continued to subscribe to the 
guardianship of the Hidden Imam, believing in his exclusive legitimacy to practice 
leadership, and, consequently, they limited the role of jurists only to socio-religious 
affairs, avoiding any involvement in public affairs (el-Labbad, 2008).  
In 1471, a Shi'i cleric named Muhammad Bin Makki, who lived in what is now 
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Lebanon, developed what he called niyabat al-foqahaa' al-aamma, literally the 
general deputizing, or vicegerency, of jurists, in which Makki asserted that some of 
the Hidden Imam's authorities, such as leading Friday prayers and organizing judicial 
systems, can be practiced by jurists on behalf of him. According to this theory, the 
community of sages, al-fuqahaa’, collectively acts as the Imam's deputy.  
This theory did not find its way into practice until the founding of the Safavid 
kingdom in Iran, which declared Shi'ism as the official creed of the country in 1501. 
Under the rule of the Safavids, Shi'i jurists were transformed from an opposition, 
oppressed group into a recognized and even privileged class. In that era, "those Shi'i 
sages buckled down to come up with what is likely to benefit the 'newborn Shi'i state' 
and support the legitimacy of the Safavid government." Shi'i seminaries, or Hawzas, 
first flourished during this era (el-Labbad, 2008, 92). 
The second conceptual development in jurists' public role came from the hands of 
the Iranian jurisprudent Sheikh Ahmed Naraaqi (d. 1867), who used the term wilayat 
al-faqih, the guardianship of jurist, for the first time in his book awaed al-ayaam. He 
extended jurists' authorities well beyond the two areas mentioned by Makki and, 
furthermore, he urged clerics to assume administrative positions asserting that "All 
[authorities] that had been to the Prophet and the Imam are transferred to the jurist" 
(el-Labbad, 2008).  
Naraqi's student, Shaykh Murtadha al-Ansari, is responsible for the third 
development, that of taqlid, the emulation, according to which every devout Shi'i 
must choose a jurist to emulate.  This principle extended the theory of the general 
guardianship of jurists (el-Labbad, 2008). He and his followers described this 
guardianship as 'general' because they could not find valid evidence, or reasonable 
interpretation, that names jurists as the designated deputies of the Hidden Imam.  
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Through centuries of interactions between Shi'i jurisprudents and governments, 
the former developed many versions of the guardianship of jurists. Following are the 
more important ones: 
1. The general guardianship of all jurists. Among the leading Iranian 
advocates were Ahmed Naraaqi, Grand Ayatollah Burujordi (died in Qum 
in 1961) and Grand Ayatollah Goulbygani (died in Qum in 1993). Those 
prominent scholars grant the guardianship to all jurists collectively rather 
than to a specific one but such guardianship encompass only particular 
authorities to organize Friday prayers and judicial systems. Most 
traditional jurists in the Shi'i Hawzas support this theory. 
2. The guardianship of the jurists' council. Ayatollah Muhammad Shirazi 
(lived in Karbala and died in Qum in 2001) called for the establishment of 
a council comprising the highest ranked jurists and practicing guardianship 
over public and religious affairs. Khomaini and al-Shirazi are considered 
the two fathers of the day absolute guardianship of the jurist though with 
some differences in details. 
3. The absolute guardianship of the jurist. This theory came into practice 
in Iran under Ayatollah Rohullah Khomaini.  It argues that the most 
competent jurist has the guardianship over all religious and non-religious 
affairs of Muslim communities. This theory has not been developed only 
under Ayatollah Khomaini, but has taken several centuries and several 
developments of other jurists.  Ayatollah Khomaini built on their previous 
judgments to articulate the final version. In 1987 and 1988, Khomaini 
further extremely developed his theory empowering "the supreme jurist to 
suspend primary principles of the faith on behalf of a virtual unlimited 
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political prerogative" (Akhavi, 1996). 
4. The guardianship limited by public elections. The theoretician of this 
principle is Ayatollah Hussein Ali Muntazari (died in Qum in 2009), who 
adopted the absolute guardianship of the jurist, that of Khomaini, but 
called for a limitation of the Supreme Leader's authorities by the elected 
bodies.  
5. Institutional (or constitutional) state under the oversight of jurists. 
Ayatollah Hussein Na'iyni (died in Najaf in 1936) developed, among 
others, a competing theory that condemned the absolute guardianship and 
called for a constitutional state operated under the supervision of jurists' 
representatives without allowing clerics to rule the people but rather 
employing the Islamic principle of hisbah, a calling of someone to account 
(Akhavi, 1996). He supported the constitutional revolution in Iran in 1906. 
6. Caliphate of people under the supervision of jurists. This theory was 
founded mainly by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was 
executed by Saddam's regime in 1980 and is the father-in-law of Muqtada 
al-Sadr. He called for the political rights of people to be independent from 
jurists‘ interventions, given that the umma caliphate is practiced based on 
two poles: Shoura (consultation) and the guardianship of believers over 
each other. Each individual‘s choice of the object for emulation, according 
to him, is achieved via the traditional mechanisms rather than general 
elections, although he was a determined advocate of institutionalizing the 
Hawza of Najaf. Mallat states that the Iranian 1979 constitution was 
significantly influenced by the writings of al-Sadr (Akhavi, 1996) 
7. The Islamic state elected by people. A model that has mostly been 
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developed by Lebanese jurists, such as Ayatollah Muhammad Jawad 
Mughnia (d. 1979) and Ayatollah Muhammad Mahdi Shams-el-Deen (d. 
2001). They tried to close the conceptual distance between the major 
Islamic principles and the modern concept of the nation-state. Mughnia 
argues that the purpose of the Islamic state is not to establish jurists 
controlling government but, instead, they themselves should obey the 
government as long as it is elected and respects the Shariy'a (el-Labbad, 
2008, 101-103). 
The Hawza of Najaf – a historical background 
The city of Najaf lies about 160 kilometers to the south of Baghdad. Its existence 
dates back to the era of Harun al-Rashid, the famous Abbasid Caliph, who ordered a 
dome to be built over Imam Ali's grave in about 170 A.H (786-87).  This encouraged 
Shi'is to come and settle in the area (Litvak, 1998). Economically, Najaf, in its earlier 
phases, lacked sustainable revenues as its main resources came from burials for pious 
Shi'is and some trade activities; 
Outside Najaf stretches Wadi al-Salam [valley of peace] which serves as a huge 
graveyard for pious Shi'is who wish to be buried near Ali's tomb…. Najaf's 
location on the old trade route from Basra to Baghdad and the pilgrimage route to 
the Hijaz compensated for its barren earth and the shortage of water." (Litvak, 
1998) 
The term 'Hawza' refers to the seminary in which the Shi'i jurisprudence is taught. 
Along with this function, it represents the spiritual and religious leadership of Shi'i 
communities, which enabled it to sustain sociopolitical influence over them. The 
Najaf Hawza is considered to be the oldest Hawza in the history of Shi'a Islam, 
having been established in about 448 A. H (1056 A.D.) by Sheikh Muhammad b. al-
Hassan al-Tusi. Sheikh al-Tusi was born in Iran but immigrated later to Baghdad 
where he completed his religious study to become eventually the highest Shi'i cleric 
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there.  
The occupation of Baghdad by the Sunni Seljuks in 1055 triggered unprecedented 
sectarian strife, in which the house and the significant library of Shaykh al-Tusi were 
burned. Prior to this devastating event, al-Tusi had lived forty years in Baghdad in 
which he was the highest Shi'i authority and so he has been called Shaykh al-
Ta’ifa, the Sheikh of the Creed. In addition, his lectures were attended by students 
from different Islamic sects in recognition of his sophisticated scientific capabilities. 
His prominence was recognized by the Abbasid Caliph, al-Qa'im Bi Amr Allah, who 
was attending his majlis (lecture place), and had granted him Kursee al-Kalaam, chair 
of religious debate. The most important contribution of al-Tusi was his studies to 
establish al-Ijtihad, independent judgment, by which a jurist can use his own rational 
approach to extract the meaning from the religious texts and develop his own edicts 
(Fakhr el-Deen, 2005). Seljuks forbade using this approach, forcing jurists and the 
people to pick one of four specific sects, namely Hanafi, Shafi'I, Maliki, and Hanbali, 
to follow in religious learning and affairs (al-Qizweeni, 2005; Nakash, 1993). 
After the burning of his house, al-Tusi decided to flee Baghdad in 
1056, immigrating to Najaf to be near the holy shrine of Imam Ali, where he 
established a Shi'i learning academy named al-Hawza al-ilmiya, or more briefly 
Hawza. The established Hawza comprised about three thousand students but the 
presence of al-Tusi was vital to the continuity of religious education because he has 
been considered one of the founders of the new Shi'i jurisprudence based on a rational 
approach and Aristotelian logical principles.  After his death, twelve years later in 
1068, the Najaf Hawza experienced a decline, though education continued.  Some 
relate this decline to the rigidity of Najafi clerics‘ methodologies, as they adhered 
closely to al-Tusi‘s views, considering it their undisputable source of 
 16 
jurisprudence and effectively setting aside ijtihad (al-Qizweeni, 2005; Nakash, 1993, 
239). Fakhr el-Deen, however, argues that such a decline was not evident and claims 
that education in Najaf Hawza after the demise of al-Tusi remained very active and 
sophisticated (Fakhr el-Deen, 2005, 370). 
In any case, Najaf lost prominence during this period relative to another Iraqi 
Shi'i Hawza, that of Hilla. It has been argued that the locations of Najaf and Hilla 
were an important factor behind such a movement, as the former is located in a dry 
desert while the latter is on the banks of the Euphrates (al-Qizweeni, 2005). 
The emergence of the Safavid Empire as a strong Shi'i state in Iran in 1501 has 
been cited as a development that promoted Shi'i religious education in general and the 
Hawzas of Najaf and Karbala in particular. 
Until the sixteenth century, however, Shi'i madrasas were built in Iraq in large 
numbers only after the rise of the Safavids in Iran in 1501. The transformation of 
Iran into a Shi'i state, and the growing Iranian interest in the shrine cities 
(including two brief periods of Safavid rule over Iraq), greatly benefited the 
shrine cities [Karbala and Najaf]. (Nakash, 1994, 239) 
Meanwhile, Isfahan, the Safavid capital, relatively overshadowed the status of 
Najaf and nearby Karbala as the leading Shi'i center of seminaries (Nakash, 1994). 
The increasing Safavid interest in Najaf and Karbala was among the strategic policies 
that they employed in their long conflict with the Ottomans. It has been argued that 
both the Ottomans and Safavids sought to employ sectarian strife in their struggle to 
confront each other (Litvak, 1998). Consequently, Iraq had become a battlefield for 
the two rival empires, a situation that had an adverse impact on its economic well-
being and political stability. Najaf and Karbala fell twice under the occupation of 
Safavids, during the periods 1508-1533 and 1622-1638, which resulted in some 
building works, but the Safavids generally supported the leading status of Isfahan and 
Mashhad (Litvak, 1998). 
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Under the Ottoman rule, Iraq suffered poor economical conditions: 
Economically, Iraq was one of the least developed areas of the Ottoman Empire. 
The weakness of the central government and the breakdown of the irrigation 
system confined agriculture to the vicinity of the cities. The country also suffered 
from major outbreaks of plague and cholera. (Litvak, 1998, 16) 
The collapse of the Safavid Empire after the fall of Isfahan in 1722 led to 
immigration of large numbers of Persian ulama to the shrine cities of Iraq, specifically 
Najaf and Karbala. In addition, the prominent Shi'i seminaries in Iran had experienced 
considerable decline during the eighteenth century, and thus the center of Shi'i 
learning once again shifted to Karbala and then to Najaf. Another factor that 
contributed to this rise was the weakness of the Ottoman-Mamluk rule in Baghdad, 
which offered Najaf and Karbala clerics much space to build more centers (Litvak, 
1998). Nakash argues that, "It was only from the mid-eighteenth century that the 
shrine cities in Iraq emerged as the focal point of Shi'i scholarship."(Nakash, 1994)  
Litvak summarizes the factors that mark the eighteenth century as a turning point for 
the Iraqi Hawzas: 
Growing pilgrimage and improved supply of water provided the necessary 
financial and physical infrastructure for learning. Finally, the reemergence of 
Usulism [rationale approaches] supplied the ulama with doctrinal tools to 
exercise a greater and more active religious and communal role. (Litvak, 1998, 
18) 
In general, the rise and decline of Hawzas belong to several factors that Nakash 
lists here: 
The fluctuations [rise and decline] reflected changes in water supply and security, 
developments within the Shi'i legal system and jurisprudence, the place of 
residence of the preeminent mujtahid, the flow of funds and students, and the 
policies of both Sunni and Shi'i governments. (Nakash, 1994, 240) 
The Najaf Hawza has frequently experienced such fluctuations in its influence, 
due to the unstable nature of these factors and the persistent competition among Shi'i 
seminaries over supremacy. In that context, the supremacy of Shi'i scholarship shifted 
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among Najaf, Karbala, Hilla, and Samarra in Iraq and Isfahan, Mashhad, and Qum in 
Iran (Nakash, 1994). The nineteenth century, however, had witnessed substantial 
reemergence in the supremacy of the Najaf Hawza which was, unlike Karbala, more 
secure from the Wahhabi
2
 attacks and less pressured by the Ottomans, but both cities 
enjoyed the relative stability that resulted from the Ottoman-Persian peace treaty of 
Erzurum signed in 1823 (Nakash, 1994; Litvak, 1998). In addition, the conversion of 
the southern Iraq tribes to the Shi'i faith broadened the popular base of the Hawza of 
Najaf (Sindawi, 2007). 
In terms of demography, certain distinctions between the two holy cities merit 
comment:   
Karbala was the larger of the two towns, with a population of about 50,000 
persons in the early 1900s, most of whom were Iranian pilgrims and immigrants. 
Najaf, with a population of about 30,000 by the early 1900s, remained a 
predominantly Arab town with a strong tribal imprint on its society and culture. 
(Litvak, 1998, 17) 
According to Nakash, Najaf had retained the leading status in Shi'i learning until 
the middle of the twentieth century, when the supremacy was transferred to Qom due 
to the political and socioeconomic developments that took place in both Iraq and Iran 
(to which further discussion will be devoted shortly). By the end of the nineteenth 
century, there were from ten to fifteen thousand students enrolled in Najaf madrasas 
(Nakash, 1994). 
The end of the nineteenth century also witnessed a significant political 
intervention by the Shi'i clerical establishment when Shaykh Muhammad Hassan al-
Shirazi issued his famous fatwa
3
 prohibiting the planting, trading, and consumption of 
tobacco. This move had important political implications because it directly confronted 
the contract signed by the Qajaris, the dynasty that succeeded the Safavids and ruled 
Iran from 1796 till 1925, and a British company, which gave the latter a fifty-year 
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exclusive right to trade in Iranian tobacco for a relatively low price. Two months after 
the fatwa‘s issuance, the contract was cancelled (Mousavi, 1985).  
In addition to the tobacco's edict, the Constitutional Revolution in Iran marked a 
new trend of political involvement by Shi'i jurists to which some scholars link the 
current interventions of Ayatollah al-Sistani in Iraq. With the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the position of marji'iyat al-taqlid, the source of emulation, was 
clearly established in the Shi'a world. In Iran, the political weight of Ayatollahs was 
substantial, as reflected during the Constitutional Revolution in 1906 of which 
Ayatollah al-Sistani's grandfather was an activist…  brought on in part by the high 
level of corruption of the Qajari shahs and their perceived tendency to give foreign 
businessmen significant franchises for cheap returns. This policy had jeopardized the 
Iranian merchants' business from which clerics' major revenues came through the 
Fifth (shi‘a tithing practice). El-Labbad states several factors that led to the heavy 
clerical intervention in this revolution: 
There are many factors led to the political tendency of [the Iranian] jurists at the 
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. In 
addition to the financial independence of clergy from the state, due to the Fifth 
and Zakah taxes, the permission given to jurists to make their own independent 
judgments, Ijtihad, and the assumption of judicial positions by clerics, it was the 
place of the highest marji', al-Shirizi, in Najaf al-Ashraf not in any Iranian town 
that made him out of the Qajari shah's reach. (el-Labbad, 2005, 50) 
The role of Najaf-based jurists was evidently critical in the movement. Support 
for the revolution was a polarizing issue within the Hawza of Najaf in which two 
currents emerged. While Ayatollah al-Khurasani and his followers offered 
unconditional support to the revolution, issuing an edict that prohibited the trading of 
anti-Muslim states' goods (el-Labbad, 2005), Ayatollah al-Yazdi publicly opposed the 
movement due to his quietest approach (Sidnawi, 2007). The revolution succeeded in 
forcing Mudhaffar al-Deen Shah to issue a new constitution establishing a parliament, 
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part of which was dedicated to the clerical class to ensure the conformity of laws with 
the Islamic Shariy'a, besides giving clerics wider authorities in judicial and civil 
systems (el-Labbad, 2005). 
The Tobacco Movement (1891-92) and the constitutional Revolution highlighted 
not only the substantial political influence of the Shi'i religious establishment but also 
the strong alliance between clergy and the Iranian Bazaar businessmen (el-Labbad, 
2005) 
 The hierarchy and structure of Najaf Hawza 
The independence of Najaf Hawza from the state represents its major structural 
feature: 
The power of the madrasas of Najaf, Shi'i sources assert, lay in the success of the 
institutions in retaining their independent Islamic identity over a period of 
thirteen centuries. Unlike the famous Egyptian madrasa of al-Azhar or any other 
Sunni madrasa, those of Najaf did not lose their political and financial 
independence. Rejecting government funds, they relied on private contributions 
and religious taxes, which assured the financial and political independence of the 
madrasas as well as their intellectual freedom. (Nakash, 1994, 243) 
The central principle in the Shi'i religious and academic hierarchy is the concept 
of emulation (taqlid) according to which each devout Shi'i (Muqallid) should emulate 
a leading cleric (Muqallad) who reaches, in his jurisprudent study, the level of 
independent judgment (Ijtihad) and is then called Mujtahid and becomes a recognized 
source of emulation. As a result, the Shi'i community has been divided into two 
classes: emulators who are ordinary Shi'is and marjas or mujtahids whom the former 
must emulate. In consequence, each Twelver Shi'i must "choose a cleric whom he 
emulates, whose advice he seeks, and who serves as a link between the believer and 
the twelfth Imam, the ‗concealed‘ Mahdi" (Sindawi, 2007).  
The theory of emulation is relatively new in Shi'a history as it dates back to the 
time of Shaykh Murtadha al-Ansari who died in 1864 and was the first Shi'i mujtahid 
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stating this theory (el-Labbad, 2005). The theory was born out of the violent conflict 
between the two schools of the Shi'a jurisprudence; Usulism and Akhbarism, a 
struggle ultimately won by the former. The Akhbari School does not recognize the 
theory of emulation nor the independent judgment, emphasizing instead the direct 
extraction of edicts from traditions because Akhbari leading clerics believe that the 
divine texts cannot be interpreted by human reasoning. Although the large majority of 
today‘s Shi'a are Usuli, there are some Akhbari communities in eastern Saudi Arabia 
and India.  Elsewhere, there is a clear sensitivity in Shi'i madrasas and in the Najaf 
Hawza in particular regarding discussion of Akhbari theories or publishing of its 
books, let alone teaching its principles. 
Under the system of emulation, the marja's is supported by a network of 
representatives who serve as the connection between the jurist and his emulators. 
Those representatives are classified according to their assigned functions into: Hawza 
teachers, Wakils (agents), and Mu'tamads (authorized representatives) who cover all 
areas where the marja has considerable numbers of emulators. There are three major 
functions of such a network: collecting religious taxes, answering the subject 
community's questions about the faith, and establishing and managing the institutions 
affiliated to the marja.  
As described by Sindawi, in the learning system of Hawzas, there are three levels 
of study that students go through: 
The first stage is preliminaries (al-muqaddamat) Studies at this stage are usually 
of an individual nature, although occasionally more than one student takes part, 
the students making up a small circle. The teacher at this stage is a more 
advanced student. This stage may last between three and five years, depending on 
the student‘s aptitude. The subjects taught at this stage are morphology, syntax, 
rhetoric, basic concepts of logic, as well as Arabic language and literature. 
Optional subjects include mathematics and astronomy. At this stage the student 
learns from certain textbooks, and only rarely goes beyond them. (Sindawi, 
2007,9) 
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The second stage is divided into two parts: The ‗surfaces of jurisprudence‘ (sutuh 
al-fiqh) and the ‗upper surfaces‘ (al-sutuh al-ulya). At this stage the subjects 
include jurisprudence, introductory philosophy, astronomy, Qur‘an exegesis, 
among others. The stage can last between four and five years. Generally the study 
is done individually, or at times in a small circle. Students can choose the lessons 
they attend, and even the textbooks they use. They are not supervised, but are 
expected to show self-discipline. At this stage, as in the following two, students 
enjoy the right to criticize their teachers and to debate with them. The extent of 
this right depends on the student‘s abilities. Its purpose is to hone the student‘s 
powers of observation. (Sindawi, 2007, 11) 
[The] third stage marks the beginning of a student‘s ability to undertake 
independent judgement (ijtihad), and is the equivalent of graduate studies at the 
university… The teacher knows his lessons by heart, quoting from memory all 
the traditions relevant to the subject without the need for a textbook. This is why 
this stage is known as ‗outside research‘ (bahth kharij): it is conducted apart from 
the textbooks… Good students who manage to do their ‗outside research‘ well 
and become proficient in philosophy and other subjects may also spend some 
time writing and teaching… The in-depth studies at this stage, the freedom to 
criticize the opinions of others and the right to debate any proposition, whatever 
its source, give the students confidence in their own opinions and prepare them to 
become sources of emulation (maraji taqlid). This stage can last anywhere 
between three and five years, and then may be further extended for another five 
to seven years, and then again for periods of up to seven years each. Depending 
on a student‘s readiness and maturity, it may even last for an entire lifetime. 
(Sindawi, 2007, 11) 
Students receive titles according to their stage and how many years they devoted 
to study. The highest three level in Hawza are:  
1. Hujjat al-Islam wal-muslimin (Proof of Islam and Muslims): a title given to 
those students who have completed their outside research and gained the Ijtihad level. 
2. Ayatollah (sign of God): given exclusively to those who acquire the highest 
level of Ijtihad and, consequently, have the authority to issue fatwas and assume 
positions within the Hawza leadership (Sindawi, 2007). The approximate period of 
study to reach this level of Ijtihad is twenty-five years. 
3. Grand Ayatollah: given only to the greatest marjas, namely marja taqleed, 
which means the source of emulation, whose fatwas are accepted among considerable 
numbers of Shi'is worldwide. Those elite scholars usually teach the Outside Research 
stage in one of the famous Hawzas such as Najaf, Qum, or Karbala. Their rulings are 
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published in the form of 'treatises'. (Sindawi, 2007)  
The first two titles are academic titles gained via an unofficial certification, ijaza, 
issued by the student‘s mentor or teacher who should be a mujtahid himself. 
Acquiring the title of Grand Ayatollah is a more complex process. Theoretically, Shi'i 
pious should emulate the mujtahid who has the a’alamiay meaning that he is ‗the 
most learned mujtahid‘ (Mousavi, 1985, 6). If an Ayatollah has the majority of the 
Hawza teachers referring to him as the most learned Ayatollah, Shi'i faithful should 
emulate him and, consequently, he assumes the marji’iyat, becoming a marja taqlid, 
and is then called Grand Ayatollah. In Najaf, for example, there are now three Grand 
Ayatollahs which is considered a small number comparing to Qum which resides 
more than ten Grand Ayatollahs. 
The systems of emulation, Wakil networks, and learning structures still follow 
old-fashion methods of administration, a matter that led many prominent, reformist  
jurists to launch several initiatives to institutionalize the Hawza. Among those clerics 
were Shaykh Muhammad Redha al-Mudhaffar, who founded Muntada al-Nashr 
schools in 1930s, and Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who helped establishing 
the college of Usul al-Din in 1964. Such attempts have faced extraordinary resistance 
by the traditional elite of Najaf Hawza, which portrayed the initiatives as a 
westernization attempt.  
How a Grand Ayatollah becomes the supreme marja 
The process of becoming a Grand Ayatollah, or being a marja, depends on many 
academic and nonacademic factors. Academically, he has to prove his excellence in 
essential religious topics, which can be demonstrated via three indicators: the number 
of Ijtihad certificates he has earned and the rank of those who licensed him; the 
number of students he teaches, and the academic value of his writings. The number of 
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a mujtahid‘s teachers and students is not, however, only a matter of learning as it is 
usually the economic ability of that Ayatollah to pay stipends for his students as well 
as his patronage networks that establish his academic and social reputations within the 
subject community. Maintaining such an economic ability depends on two main 
sources of revenues, that of the Fifth (Khums), and the donations of shrines‘ pilgrims 
(Sindawi, 2007; Mousavi, 1985).  
It is noteworthy that these religious-educational ranks have been occasionally 
misused by the Ayatollahs' regime in Iran. The Supreme Leader Ali Khamana'ei, for 
instance, held the title of Hujjat el-Islam wal-Muslimeen when the revolution broke 
out but since then his colleagues in the Islamic government began to call him 
Ayatollah Khamana'ei while the major marjas of Qum, such as Grand Ayatollahs 
Gulbygani, Mar'ashi Najafi, and al-Iraqi, still call him Hujjat el-Islam. Traditional 
Ayatollahs in Qum and Najaf perceived such attempts as a serious threat to politicize 
the well-established system of hierarchy
4
 (el-Labbad, 2005).  
Regarding the determination of the supreme marja in the world, it is argued that 
such a matter depends, in addition to the factors above, on which Hawza is the 
residence of each competitive mujtahid. Cole states that: 
The clerics of Najaf in particular enjoy great prestige in Iraq and throughout the 
Shi'ite world, and in the twentieth century outside Iran the convention has been 
that the most senior grand ayatollah in Najaf is the chief legal and religious 
authority for lay Shi'ites. (Cole, 2003, 6) 
On the other hand, because the Shi'i Hawza‘s history frequently witnessed the 
emergence of two contemporary marjas in two different shrine cities, the task of 
identifying the highest marja and the leading Hawza of the Shi'a worldwide is 
difficult. In most cases, having two prominent seminaries at the same time prevented 
either from claiming supremacy (Mousavi, 1985). Besides, the fact that Ayatollahs 
who assume such a position are usually old men makes the task much more complex, 
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because just when the supremacy of a marja becomes well-established within the 
religious community, he may be lost (el-Labbad, 2005). 
After the death of Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim (of Najaf) in 1970, Grand 
Ayatollah Abol-Qasim al-Kho'ei (of Najaf) assumed the marji’iyat and was 
considered the highest marja for the Shi'a worldwide until his death in 1992. 
Meanwhile, Gulbygani was considered the highest marja in Iran. Since the demise of 
al-Kho'ei and the leading Qumi marjas, Gulbygani, Mar'ashi Najafi, and al-Iraqi, the 
regime in Tehran has been trying to establish the marji'iyat of Khamana'ei in Iran and 
worldwide but it has failed to do so despite the huge resources devoted
5
 (el-Labbad, 
2005). Since 2003, Khamana'ei has established several madrasas in Najaf and Karbala 
trying to establish his reputation as a marja in these two prominent Hawzas. 
The finance of the Hawza of Najaf 
In addition to the system of emulation, the marjas' authority and independency 
have been promoted by the Khums, literally the fifth, which represents "a tax paid by 
Shı‗ites on their annual income to their ‗sources of emulation‘ and mujtahidun" 
(Sindawi, 2007). The tax value equals one-fifth of the annual income surplus
6
 of 
households (el-Labbad, 2008). In the Sunni doctrine, the Khums is considered as an 
exclusive right to the Prophet whose death ended the legitimate collecting of this 
religious tax while the Shi'i school of theology argues that this right was extended to 
Ahl al-Bait, the family of the Prophet, and their descendents, as they are prohibited 
from receiving al-Zakat to save their dignity. 
Among the Hawza's financial resources, the Khums represents the major one. It is 
divided into two equal parts: Sahm al-Sada, the share of the Prophet's descendents, 
and Sahm al-Imam, the share of Imam al-Mahdi. While an emulator has the option to 
hand the former to indigents or the marja's Wakil, he/she has to deliver the latter to 
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his source of emulation because it is dedicated to maintain the religious 
establishments and its civil organization for which the marja is responsible (Khalaji, 
2006). 
Organizationally, the bureaucratic apparatus of a jurist is responsible for 
collecting the Khums and spending it on the specified categories of beneficiaries 
under the supervision of the marja. This process lacks both transparency and 
accountability. Because the marjas of Hawza used to rely on their relatives in 
managing their offices, many accused the latter of being unjust in spending those 
funds or using them to promote the marja’s socio-religious position (Kelidar, 1983). 
This independence has its disadvantages. Unlike Sunni madrasas, Shi'i Hawzas in 
Iraq lack significant awqaf (religious endowments), critical to sustainably managing 
them because of the discrimination they had suffered. The lack of having Iraqi 
benefactors led Najaf Hawza to rely on Iranian merchants and officials to support 
them by building madrasas and other related institutions (Nakash, 1994). Another 
reason for Najaf‘s financial limitations was the confiscation policy that the Ba'ath 
regime, and previous governments, implemented on the Shi'i endowments. On the 
other hand, the Iranian Hawzas of Qum and Mashhad enjoyed the privilege of having 
substantial endowments. Nevertheless, after the Islamic revolution, the regime has 
confiscated some endowments belonging to those Ayatollahs who criticized the 
Supreme Leader or did not recognize his absolute guardianship (Khalaji, 2006). Apart 
from these resources, Najaf Hawza, like other shrine cities' seminaries, benefited from 
the donations the pilgrims of Imam Ali's shrine offer.  
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Chapter Three  
The Political Role of Najaf Hawza in Iraq 
  
It has been described in the previous chapter how the Shi'a have grown in the 
Muslim society as an opposition current more than a social community. This 
contributed, later on, to make the Hawza the head of this opposition movement or, at 
least, the rulers have dealt with on that base. Consequently, the Hawza has had a 
political role to play whether it sought to or not. In the modern Iraq, this role of Najaf 
Hawza has been further critical due to the discrimination the Iraqi Shi'a suffered from 
in the newborn state, the competition with the emerging Hawza of Qum and its 
activist approach, and the interaction with the Shi'i political parties. These three 
aspects will be researched throughout this chapter. 
 
The Hawza of Najaf and Modern Iraq 
Iraq has a diverse demography in which ethnic and sectarian identities overlap. 
The Arab, Kurd, and Turkmen are the three major ethnic groups while Sunni and 
Shi'a are the main Islamic sectarian groups. Iraq is an overwhelmingly Islamic 
country though Christianity is the second religious group (Luizard, 1995).  There are 
many minority groups, however, including, in addition to the Turkmen, the Assyrians 
and other Christians, the Fayli Kurds, the Shabaks, the Sabaeans, and Yazidians, 
which represent either ethnic, or ethnic-religious, minorities. Most sources put the 
Shi'a in the lead with 60% of the whole Iraqi population while Sunni Arab and Kurds 
predominate among the rest (Eyadat, 2009).   
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, Britain occupied the 
three Ottoman Wilayat, or provinces, of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul and merged them 
into the new state of Iraq.  This state was under the direct control and administration 
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of the occupiers (Ismael & Ismael, 2005 and Noorbaksh, 2008). The social structure 
of the country had been overwhelmingly based on a tribal hierarchy that had gained 
strength over the centuries whenever the Ottoman occupation, and its central 
authorities were weak (Noorbaksh, 2008, 54). Sectarian divisions also were clear 
because most Shi'is and Sunnis were living separate lives until the 1950s, albeit there 
was more mixing of the sects in some cities. However, Munson argues that:  
Despite the longstanding sectarian division of Islam, sectarian identities in Iraq 
are not old and immobile. Many of Iraq‘s Shi'a are relatively recent converts. As 
nomadic Aras settled around the southern Shi'a cities of Iraq in the last century 
and a half, many converted from Sunni to Shi'a. (Munson, 2009, 18) 
Sunnis and Shi'is of Iraq had perceived their Ottoman rulers differently. While 
the Sunni Arabs in Iraq were closely tied to the Ottomans, who were Sunnis 
themselves, their Shi'i counterparts considered the Ottoman caliphate as usurpation, 
leading them to avoid public schools and government service (Munson, 2009, 19). 
Moreover, in pursuing their mandate-ship over Iraq, the British failed to address inter-
sectarian integration. In this regard, Munson states: 
The colonial administration chose the urban Sunnis who had staffed the local 
institutions of the Ottoman Empire as they preferred drivers of modernization, 
shunning Shi'a clerics as impediments to progress… the new Iraqi Army was also 
almost exclusively made up of former offices of the Ottoman Army, the majority 
of whom were Sunni. Sunni dominance in the Iraqi government was a fact 
established from the earliest days of its existence. (Munson, 2009, 19) 
When the twentieth century began, the Najaf Hawza enjoyed religious and 
political supremacy over the Shi'i centers in the South: 
By the twentieth century, the power of mujtahids and students in the city posed a 
serious challenge to the Qajar and Ottoman governments, as well as to the 
growing British interests in Iraq and Iran. Najaf became a major player in Iranian 
politics, a development which culminated during the Constitutional Revolution… 
the city emerged as a force attempting to lead a jihad movement against the 
growing European penetration of Muslim territories, and it played a dominant 
role in instigating the 1920 revolt in Iraq. (Nakash, 1994, 247) 
This leading status, however, began to deteriorate in 1908, two years after the 
 29 
breakdown of the Constitutional Revolution. The relationship between students and 
mujtahids was affected by the dispute over the stand towards the revolution; while 
students supported deeper reforms in Iran, the Ayatollahs‘ support was only to ensure 
the conformity of law with the shariy'a. In addition, after having their demands 
regarding taxes and tariffs realized by the Qajari Shah, the Bazaaris felt that they no 
longer needed the support of jurists whether in Iran or in Najaf.  As a result, they 
decreased their contribution to the mujtahids. In addition, the number of Imam Ali 
shrine pilgrims had considerably dropped, leaving students with lower allowances 
(Nakash, 1994).  
In 1920, Shiite and Sunni tribal sheiks of Iraq launched the Eshreen (literally, the 
twenty) Revolution as a liberation war against the British rule that had just been 
established. The revolt was motivated by the fatwas of prominent Shi'ite clerics and 
other factors such as "The oppressive nature of colonial occupation
7
 in addition to 
increased taxes — and the British reluctance to honor their commitment to end 
occupation." (Noorbaksh, 2008, 54) Shi'i leading clerics were divided regarding the 
stand towards the British Mandate according to their quietest-activist approaches. 
Ayatollahs Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi, Shaykh el-Shariy'a al-Asfahani, and Mahdi 
al-Khalisi, as activists, called for armed resistance against the British. In contrast, 
Ayatollah Kazim al-Yazdi, the leading marja in Najaf, refused to become involved in 
the matter, saying to tribal leaders who approached him that he knew nothing about 
politics (Kelidar, 1983, 9). As leading marjas, they faced a situation in which they 
could not accept the British Mandates nor exploit the end of the anti-Shi'i Ottoman 
occupation to call for a religious state. Regarding the project of Ayatollah al-Shirazi, 
Kelidar argues: 
He advocated the establishment of a Muslim Arab kingdom for which the second 
son of Sharif Husain, Abdullah [the later king of Jordan], was proposed as ruler. 
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Al-Shirazi wrote to Sharif Husain in Mecca on the subject and sent delegates to 
consult with him on the matter. The fact that Abdullah was the scion of Al al-
Bayt was an important consideration for the Shiis, as it was for his younger 
brother Faisal when he became king in 1921. The alliance between the religious 
mujtahids, the tribal chiefs, and the notables of the towns against the mandatory 
authorities made the rebellion of 1920 possible. (Kelidar, 1983, 9) 
Responding to these complex circumstances, the British "organized an elected 
parliamentary system and constitutional monarchy" (Ismael & Ismael, 2005, 611) and 
brought Faisal Ibn Al-Hussein, a descendent of Prophet Mohamed and son of the 
Sharif of Mecca Hussein Bin Ali, in 1921 to be the first Hashemite monarch in Iraq.  
He ruled until his death in 1933. Under the rule of the Hashemites, the leading Shi'a 
Ayatollahs articulated two major stands. The first was that of Ayatollah Hussein al-
Na‘iyni, an Iranian-born marja lived in Najaf, while the other represented the position 
of Ayatollah al-Khalisi, an Iraqi Marja’. Abbas Kelidar articulates the former‘s 
position by stating: 
It is true that a leading mujtahid, Shaykh Husain al-Na'iyni, pronounced in favour 
of a constitutional representative government when examining the Constitutional 
Revolution of Iran in 1906. His treatise defined the rights and duties of the state 
and its subjects, the nature and extent of the role of the mujtahids and the 
delegates in the parliamentary deliberations to ensure the compatibility of 
parliamentary laws with the basic tenets of Islam, and on the ways of avoiding 
tyranny in the absence of the Imam's rule. (Kelidar, 1983, 9) 
On the other hand, Ayatollah al-Khalisi, along with other marjas, issued a fatwa 
prohibiting the believers from dealing with the government taking into account that 
the British Mandate still continued. This step further undermined the already weak 
representation of the Shi'a in public institutions. Moreover, it led to tribal protests to 
which the government responded by exiling those Ayatollahs to Iran under the charge 
that they were originally from Iran (Kelidar, 1983, 9) 
Although some educated Shi'ite Iraqis were occasionally appointed to high 
ranking political positions, the Shi'a had been politically isolated since 1920. After 
leading the liberalizing revolution against British occupiers, they found themselves 
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marginalized in political life (Noorbaksh, 2008). Their initial actions may have 
worsened this situation as they "boycotted the election under British occupation [in 
1922] and the domination of the government apparatus by a Sunni monarchy. They 
also boycotted the constitution that was written with the aid of the British occupiers, 
leading to their total isolation from decision making and influence in politics and 
government for the remainder of the twentieth century." (Noorbaksh, 2008, 59) Shi'ite 
marginalization was so apparent that the Sunni king, Faysal I, wrote in 1933 that: 
"Shiite ulama have no connection with the government and are at present 
estranged from it, particularly in as much as they see the Sunni ulama in 
possession of funds and properties of which they are deprived, and envy, notably 
among the religious classes, is something well known.‖ (Noorbaksh, 2008, 59) 
In addition, the ruling Sunni elite spared no effort to ensure their supremacy over 
the Shi'i majority to the extent that some southern Shi'i sheikhs began feeling they 
were a minority (Nakash, 1994). By issuing the law of citizenship in 1925, many 
Shi'is in Southern Iraq was excluded from holding the new Iraqi nationality because 
the law awarded it only to those who already held the Ottoman cards. Taking to 
account that the Shi'is used to claim the Iranian nationality to avoid the Ottoman 
conscription, they were left unable to assume the Iraqi nationality and, thus, 
anygovernment posts (Kelidar, 1983) 
In addition to the citizenship law, the National Defense Act proposed by the 
parliament in 1927 had deepened the sectarian tensions when Shi'is perceived it as 
another attempt to establish a Sunni-dominant army. Besides tribal figures, Ayatollah 
Muhammad Hussein Kashif al-Ghitaa opposed it. Because of the absence of a united 
Shi'i leadership, the bill was passed later on in 1932 in the era of King Ghazi after 
ignoring all Kashif al-Ghitaa's calls and letters. In 1935, some Shi'i tribes in Rumaitha 
and Nassiriya in the south revolted in a response to arresting one of the Ayatollah's 
representatives, an uprising to which the government of Yasin al-Hashimi reacted by 
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sending military planes and bombing those tribes' villages. The event underscored the 
deep sectarian dispute and undermined the reputation of the Najafi Ayatollahs whom 
the Shi'i politician of Baghdad accused of mismanaging the crisis (Nakash, 1994). 
In 1958, the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in a military coup led by the 
Free Officers headed by Abd el-Karim Qasim, who announced the republic of Iraq 
(Noorbaksh, 2008). This event had led to a series of coups and uprisings which 
basically represented the ideological conflicts of the late 20
th
 Century, such as 
Arabism, Communism, Kurdish activism, Ba'athism, and Islamism.  
Iran was not neutral in these developments. Abbas Kelidar believes that Iran, 
under the Shahs and the Ayatollahs, has exploited the resentments of the Iraqi Shi'is 
towards the sectarian-based discrimination against them by the central government to 
bolster Irani efforts to control the Gulf or to have a larger share in Shat el-Arab, the 
main port in the region: 
Iran under the Shah or the rule of the ayatollahs has sought to destabilize the 
politics of Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gulf States through the politicization and the 
radicalization of sectarian sentiment. These attempts, coupled with the nature and 
history of Arab nationalism, have precipitated the polarization of society in these 
states. The appearance of such organizations as Amal in Lebanon and al-Da'wa in 
Iraq, is but a symptom of this polarization, which has ruined many years of useful 
bridge-building to obtain national integration in society and politics. (Kelidar, 
1983, 15) 
Shi'ite clerics had primarily spent the period between 1958 and 1968 interacting 
with the government according to its position towards the communists and pan-
Arabists. The then emerging Communist Party was a serious threat to the Shi'ite 
clergy as its ideology was spreading even inside their headquarters, Najaf and 
Karbala. Responding to the flourishing atheist movement, the Shi'ite ulama were 
divided into two groups, the traditional, quietest clerics and the reformist, activist 
ulama. The latter founded the Jama'at al-Ulama. This group had temporarily 
maintained a good relationship with the regime of General Abd el-Kareem Qasim 
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(1958-63) but the two parties fell out when Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim issued 
his anti-communist fatwa (Aziz, 1993) 
Within that atmosphere, the young Ayatollah Mohamed Baqir al-Sadr represented 
the anti-communism activists and reformist clerics in the Hawza of Najaf. He 
published his two prominent books, Falsafatuny (our philosophy), and Iqtisadony (our 
economic system), in which he argued that Islam represented a third road, along with 
Capitalism and Communism, that could address the philosophical, economical, and 
political dilemmas of human societies (Mallat, 1988). Al-Sadr was the spiritual leader 
of the Da'wa Party, which was established by a group of Shi'ite intellectuals in their 
struggle against the dominant secular movements, Arabism and communism (Aziz, 
1980; Noorbaksh, 2008). Aziz stated the agenda of the Da'wa Party as follows: 
The aim of the Da'wa was to organize dedicated Muslim believers with the goal 
of seizing power and establishing an Islamic state. To achieve that goal it would 
indoctrinate revolutionaries, fight the corrupt regime, and establish an Islamic 
state; then it would go on to implement Islamic laws and export the Islamic 
revolution to the rest of the world. (Aziz, 1993, 209) 
On the other hand, Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, father of Muhammed Baqir al-
Hakim, represented the traditional cleric who does not get involved in political affairs. 
He did, however, issue a famous fatwa which "identified communism with atheism 
and forbade Muslims from joining the Communist party or helping its cause. [This] 
embarrassed the Qasim government and forced General Qasim to abandon the Iraqi 
Communist party" (Aziz, 1993). He also refused to meet General Qasim unless the 
latter canceled the civil-rights law as he believed that it violated Islamic teachings 
(Aziz, 1993). The period of 1964-1968 was considered as the "golden era" for the 
Shi'ite politics for several reasons: 
First because the Ba'thist-Arif regime felt indebted to the Shi'i religious 
establishment for its help in discrediting and ousting Qasim's regime, and second, 
because the new regime gained legitimacy from the Shi'i leaders who supported 
their crackdown on Communist forces in the country (ironically, most of those 
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prosecuted were also Shi'i). (Aziz, 1993, 211) 
As late as 1960s, Jama'at el-Ulama, supported by al-Sadr, had continued to 
expand in terms of functions and structures. They also organized a group of militant 
clerics in Najaf where they were exposed to a police crackdown in 1969. Mallat 
summarizes the structure and functions of their main networks, which were located in 
Najaf and Karbala, saying: 
A whole network of Islamic social and educational institutions was organised to 
provide various services, such as 'the dispensary of the Holy Koran', an Islamic 
club, a marriage committee …, and a film centre. Islamic schools enjoyed, of 
course, priority... These schools were meant to prepare the new generation, 
educated 'Islamically', 'to enter the ranks of religious men', and to work on 
graduating 'intellectuals with a sane educational background'. The school 
structure is said to reach 'more than 2,000 male and female students. (Mallat, 
1988, 22) 
In 1968, a small group of right-wing Ba'athists led by Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr 
managed a successful coup and assumed power, which they held until the Ba‘athist 
defeat by the US-led coalition in 2003. Saddam Hussein had removed el-Bakr in 1979 
in an internal coup and ruled the country until his overthrow by the US. This regime 
immediately began to undermine the Najaf Hawza authority, which it perceived as an 
intolerable internal threat to its Arabist, secular agenda: 
Its [the Ba'ath regime] first step toward limiting the Shi'is power was to curtail 
their religious activities; this included the closing of the Jawadayn elementary 
and high schools and the Usul al-Din College in Baghdad, confiscating the land 
and funds set aside for building Kufa [religious] University, shutting down the 
Risalat al-Islam (the only religious journal the government allowed to be 
published at that time), prohibiting the mawakib al-talaba [students‘ processions] 
in Karbala. (Aziz, 1993) 
During 1970s, Najaf was not only the spiritual capital of the Shi'a world, but also 
the heart of its revolutionary movements. Two leading revolutionary Ayatollahs were 
residing there, Rohullah al-Khomaini, expelled from Iran, and Mohammed Baqir al-
Sadr. Their transnational religious movement included ulama from Iraq, Iran, and 
Lebanon and was under the supervision of Ayatollah Mahdi al-Hakim, brother of 
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Muhammed Baqir al-Hakim (Mallat, 1988). The conflict between al-Sadr and the 
Ba'ath regime reached a peak in 1977 when the government banned the annual Shi'ite 
commemorations of Imam Hussein. After issuing a fatwa that prevented the faithful 
from joining the Ba'ath Party and publicly supported the Islamic revolution of Iran, al-
Sadr was detained but released one day later when large demonstrations by his 
followers broke out in Iraq's southern and central cities. The regime then launched a 
large campaign of arrests and executions against al-Sadr's students, al-Da'wa party 
members, and all activist Shi'ite clerics and intellectuals. The campaign left the Shi'ite 
religious network weak enabling the regime to detain al-Sadr and his sister, Amina, 
on April 5, 1980, and execute them three days later (Aziz, 1993). 
After the defeat of Saddam's forces in Kuwait, the Shi'ites attempted an uprising 
in March 1991 but the uprising was exposed to brutal oppression by the regime's 
republican guards and put down. Although the revolt was initiated by popular 
protests, some clerics became involved in ruling some regions. The eminent marja of 
Najaf at the time, Grand Ayatollah al-Kho'ie, issued an announcement in which he 
established a nine-member committee to restore order and maintain public services. 
Kho'ie's son, Abdel-Majid (later killed in Najaf on April 2003 by a mob linked to 
Muqtada al-Sadr), was a member of the board. The religious orientation of the 
uprising was one of the factors that led the US to give a green light to the regime to 
crush the revolt, although President Bush had urged the Iraqi people and army to 
overthrow the Saddam regime (Depra, 2005). The head of the Supreme Council for 
the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah M. Baqir al-Hakim, broadcasted speeches on radio 
from Iran urging people to continue fighting the regime but did not enter the 'librated' 
south to lead the movement.  
Three months later, a group of leading Shi'i figures met the American Secretary 
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of State James Baker. Abd el-Majeed el-Khoi was one of the prominent personalities 
in that group. They handed the Americans a document that articulated the demand and 
perception of the Iraqi Shi'a regarding the future governance system of Iraq and the 
relation with the US government. The document calls for an "Islamic Arab democratic 
state" that would not entail implementing the Iranian style of welayat el-faqih but 
rather ensuring the conformity of laws with major Islamic principles. It emphasizes 
also that most Shi'is worldwide, including the Iranians, follows Ayatollah Khoi rather 
than the Iranian clerics (el-Rubay'ee, 2007).  
Contention between Najaf and Qum 
There was a hidden factor that led to the decline of the Najaf madrasas as the 
leading Shi'i learning center in the twentieth century. It is related to the long, gradual 
process of 'persianizing' the Hawza, i.e., making it more Persian. The immigration 
movement of Iranian clerics into Najaf, which began in the eighteenth century and 
continued in the nineteenth century, affected the Arab culture, identity, and language 
of the Hawza. By the end of eighteenth century, the Arab students and marjas became 
a minority within the religious community.  
This critical shift has weakened the former ability of the Hawza to deliver Iraqi 
intellectuals and literary figures who "could direct intellectual and mental 
development of their society." (Nakash, 1994, 257) It created a gap between the 
Hawza and the community of Najaf and another gap between Najaf and Baghdad, 
"hindering the potential social and intellectual exchange between Sunnis and Shi'is in 
Iraq"(Nakash, 1994). The emergent Persian spirit of the Hawza made it lose its former 
leading status "as a major center of intellectual and literary activity in the Arab 
world." (Nakash, 1994, 257) In terms of language, Arab students in higher levels need 
academic instructions from teachers who use Persian in their classes. 
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Parallel to this decline in Najaf's supremacy in Iraq, Qum was experiencing a 
flowering in Iran especially during the marji'iyat of Ayatollah Burujordi in the 1940s 
and 50s, during which there was not a well-identified supreme marja in Najaf. 
Although based in Qum, Burujordi was the major funder of the Najaf, Karbala, and 
Samarra madrasas in Iraq, which adversely affected the supremacy of Najaf in the 
Shi'i world (Nakash, 1994). When Burujordi died in 1961, Shah Muhammad Riza of 
Iran sent a letter of condolence to Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim in Najaf in an 
attempt to promote the Najaf supremacy over that of Qum, which was resisting the 
Iranian Shah's disputable reforms.  
The subsequent decade, the 1960s, witnessed a relative return in Najaf‘s leading 
status under the marji'iyat of al-Hakim, considered then the highest Shi'i marja 
worldwide. But his death in 1970 and the rise of the Ba'ath rule in Iraq caused the 
Hawza to suffer unprecedented suppression and decline in the Shi'i world. By 1985, 
the number of Najaf's students, mujtahids, and other learning functionaries was about 
150 as a result to the policy of deportation and the flow of clerics from Najaf to Qum 
(Nakash, 1994) 
On the other hand, Qum maintained its leading status under the rule of Ayatollahs 
who made the supremacy of Qum a high priority objective. The Qumi Ayatollahs, 
unlike Najafis in prior eras, paid more attention to promoting preaching activities and 
establishing more publications to keep the ordinary Shi'is in a close relationship with 
the clergy (Nakash, 1994) 
In terms of theocracy, many scholars believe that Najaf represents the quietist 
approach while Qum tends to favor the guardianship of jurist: 
This current of thought [quietism] has always been dominant in Najaf. The 
Iranian ayatollah Khomeini, who lived in this city from 1965 to 1978 and 
supported the opposite thesis, was completely isolated.  The thesis of Khomeini, 
which he embodied in 1979 with his theocratic revolution in Iran, was that "only 
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a good society can create good believers." And he granted to the clerics the 
political power necessary to establish the perfect society. Khoei and Sistani, on 
the contrary, held that "only good citizens can create a good society." And they 
rejected any idea of theocracy. (Magister, 2004) 
Some scholars believe that the Shi'i seminaries in both Iraq and Iran are 
experiencing a decline due to two opposite forces: 
The decline of marji'iyat, which is related to the waning of the Shiite seminary‘s 
independence, is essentially caused by two facts: the anti-Shiite policy of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq, and the emergence of a Shiite clerical government in Iran. Both 
in opposite ways succeeded in destroying the seminary and the authority that 
comes from it—the first by suppressing it directly and hostilely, and the second 
by depriving it of its independence and transforming the seminary from a semi-
independent semi-civil institution into an affiliate of the political authority. 
(Khalaji, 2006, 36) 
Moreover, Khalaji predicts the end of the Shi'i traditional marji'iyat in the post-
Sistani era claiming that Walayat al-faqih doctrine would dominate the Shi'i scene 
exploiting the huge resources of Iran: 
Khamenei is now the master of the Shiite network in the region. Even Sistani as 
the greatest marja of the Shiite world has no great power to make any dramatic 
change in politics or on social grounds. Developments in Iraq have shown that 
Sistani has been incapable of preventing the Shiite political groups from entering 
into a sectarian war. (Khalaji, 2006, 36) 
Mustafa el-Labbad argues, however, that the reemergence of the Hawza of Najaf 
under the leadership of Ayatollah al-Sistani would threaten the position of Iran as the 
political representative of the Shi'a in the future (el-Labbad, 2005). Another factor in 
that regard is the diminishing independency of the Hawza of Qum under the rule of 
Tehran's Ayatollahs. The Islamic Republic's leadership, especially Khamana'i, has 
maintained a policy that made Qum's religious establishment financially and 
organizationally dependent on the state in which  
The establishment became totally dependent on the government's financial 
resources, social authority, networking, organization, and political status… 
Clerics receive hefty regular stipends from the government, and many ayatollahs 
have exclusive privileges for numerous profit-making transactions. The 
government has modernized and bureaucratized the clerical establishment by 
creating the Center for Seminary Management, which is under direct supervision 
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of Khamenei and is in full control of clerical finances, the seminary's educational 
system, and the political direction of the establishment. Even Iraq's Grand 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, along with other influential Shiite leaders, allegedly runs 
his offices [in Iran] within the framework of the Center (Khalaji, 2009) 
Djavadi, in turn, believes that this heavy control over the Iranian seminaries has 
harmed the establishment's independence; 
Most of the influential and popular marjas, such as Grand Ayatollahs Mohammad 
Kazem Shariatmadari and Hossein Ali Montazeri, were put under house arrest or 
forced into passivity. Under the new system, more than 200,000 mullahs became 
receivers of government salaries and benefits — and were therefore largely 
silenced. This was an unprecedented development in Iranian history, during 
which Shi‘ite clerics were always dependent solely on voluntary religious 
donations. (Djavadi, 2010) 
He also refers to the fanatic ideology which they use in justifying such 
interventions; 
This new system was formulated with this statement: ―Under the open sky, the 
only just position is that of the supreme leader.‖ This simplistic ideology was 
pronounced by Ahmad Khatami, an ultraconservative member of the Assembly 
of Experts that elects or fires the supreme leader. Another member of the same 
body, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, reportedly issued a fatwa before last 
June‘s presidential election, saying that it is permissible to ―change‖ or 
manipulate election results to prevent the victory of the enemies of the supreme 
leadership. 
The Hawza of Najaf and the Shi'i political organizations 
The Shi'i struggle to gain political rights in the twentieth century Iraq has 
generated several political parties and organizations that have consistently had a 
degree of affiliation with the Hawza's Ayatollahs. Some Shi'i clerics and intellectuals 
established such organizations to deal with the Sunni-dominated, central government. 
Following the current more significant parties and movements: 
During the 1940s and 50s, many Shi'i organizations were established representing 
this wing of activist clerics and intellectuals. For example, there were Munazamat al-
Shabab al-Muslim, Muslim Youth Organization, (1940s), al-Ja'fari Party (1950s), and 
al-Shabab al-Aqa'ideyeen (1950s). Many prominent members of these movements 
joined the Da'wa Party when it was established in 1950s. Al-Da'wa al-Islamiya Party 
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is considered one of the most significant political parties in the Iraqi Shi'i scene 
because many Shi'i political movements were founded by ex-members in the Da'wa 
Party such as SCIRI, Hizbollah, and Amal Movement (Dai, 2008). 
1. Al-Da'wa al-Islamiya Party, the Islamic Call Party 
Since its founding in 1957, the Da'wa party has passed through three turning 
points that contributed to its evolution toward an embrace of Iraqi nationalism without 
abandoning its basis in Islamic doctrine; 
firstly, it shifted from a reformist Islamic organization to a revolutionary 
movement in the mid-1970s because of the complex influences of oppression, 
restriction by regulation, and segmentation of the leadership; secondly, it had to 
evacuate from Iraq to Iran after the Iranian revolution 1979 because of severe 
oppression by the Ba‗thist regime; thirdly, it distanced itself from the Iranian 
authority in the late 1980s. (Dai, 2008, 1) 
The comprehensive suppression campaign of the Ba'ath regime discussed 
previously left the most prominent Shi'i party, al-Da'wa, shattered, with the majority 
of its cadres either executed or exiled in Iran, Syria, or the UK. This situation led to 
several splintering processes within the party's structure from which many of the 
present organizations emerged. The major split happened in Iran in 1984 in which 
some of the party's members refused the attempts of the Ayatollah‘s regime to control 
it and left Iran for Syria and London to preserve the independence of the party, while 
others joined the ISCI (Kemp, 2005). Having adopted the election as an 
organizational system, the party held its assembly in 1988 in which it abolished its 
former al-majlis al-fiqhi, the Jurisprudence Council, which had consisted of senior 
jurists close to the Iranian regime such as Kazim al-Ha'iri and Mehdi al-Asafi. This 
conflict between the party's clerics and non-clerics reflected a struggle for survival 
against the Iranian hegemony. The abandoning of the pro-Irani ulama helped the party 
to maintain a national agenda in the 1990s (Dai, 2005). The party had to pay the price 
of this step which was reflected in leaving Iran and seeking new exile bases in Syria 
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and the UK. On the other hand, the new independent approach helped the party to 
maintain a national identity in the 1990s apart from the foreign agendas (Dai, 2005). 
The party witnessed several splinters in exile. One of these was the al-Da'wa 
Party – Tanzeem al-Iraq (the Iraqi Branch). The group is mainly centered in Basra and 
its main distinctive feature is its clear rejection of Khomeini's Walayat al-faqih (Cole, 
2003). This party is now part of al-Maliki's State of Law coalition. 
Although it boycotted the Iraqi opposition conferences organized by the US in 
late 2002 and on April 28, 2003 in London and Nassiriya respectively on the basis of 
its Islamist orientation, al-Da'wa eventually chose to pragmatically engage in the US-
led political transition, joining the Iraqi Governing Council (Cole, 2003). Unlike ISCI 
and the Sadrists, the party does not maintain a large militia. Nor does it have the 
formers' capability to mobilize popular support (Duss & Juul, 2009). One important 
development of al-Da'wa's approach was adoption of a national agenda prior to the 
Iraqi provincial elections on January 2009, which the al-Da'wa-led coalition won: 
The most prominent change, however, has been Da‘wa‘s embrace of a nationalist 
platform for its provincial campaigns. Maliki‘s [the current secretary of the party] 
decision to name the Da‘wa‘s coalition ―State of Law‖ reflects a shift in emphasis 
from religious identification and Islamist social politics to bread-and-butter issues 
such as basic public services and security. This also reflects a sense of the 
growing disenchantment voters have with the religious party-controlled 
government‘s inability to provide basic services. (Duss & Juul, 2009) 
Another move in this direction was al-Maliki‘s split from the United Iraqi 
Alliance, the Shi'i list which won in the 2005 elections. This nationalist tendency, 
however, has not guaranteed his coalition a majority or plurality in the parliament that 
will result from the March 2010 elections (still in dispute at this writing).  
The party's present manifesto is not clear as to its stance on the guardianship of 
the jurist, previously one of its central principles. What is obvious is the reluctance of 
the party to publicly and practically advocate walayat al-faqih. 
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A senior party source … claimed that "[al-Da'wa] shall accept everything that the 
public will accept even if they choose a perfectly non-Islamic regime. If they do 
not choose Islam, this means that they are not prepared for it. If Islam is imposed, 
it will become an Islamic dictatorship and this would alienate the public." This 
may in part be a response influenced by the experience of post-revolutionary 
political rule in neighboring Iran, but is more likely recognition of the fact that 
there is a diversity in the communal makeup of the Iraqi polity that precludes the 
adoption of political Islam as the state ideology at present. (Shanahan, 2004) 
2. Munazzamat al-Amal al-Islami, the Islamic Task Organization,  
This movement was initiated in early 1970s although it was not formally 
established until 1979. Grand Ayatollah Mahdi al-Shirazi, the theoretician of Shoura 
al-foqahaa (jurists' council), was its first leading jurist. 
In the early 1970s he and his brother Hasan (assassinated in Lebanon in 1980) 
formed their own organization, al-'Amal al-Islami, as a result of disagreement 
with Da'wa over an issue of leadership of the party and political tactics. When al-
Shirazi announced his marja'iyya in 1970, Muhammad Taqi al-Mudrisi and Hadi 
al-Mudrisi headed al-'Amal, while Shirazi assumed the role of spiritual leader of 
the organization. (Aziz, 1993) 
The organization was part of the UIA, the Shi'i block, in the Iraqi Parliament of 
2005-2009, holding only a few seats.  
3. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly SCIRI) 
The ISCI is a Shi'i organization that was established in Tehran in 1982. 
Khomaini's regime encouraged a few Iraqi expatriate clerics and politicians to form 
the ISCI with the aim of toppling Saddam's regime. In 1984, Ayatollah Muhammad 
Baqir al-Hakim was appointed to lead the organization. The organization has a 
paramilitary branch called the Badr brigades (Noorbaksh, 2008; Cole, 2003). The core 
ideology of this organization has been its belief in the unilateral, absolute 
guardianship of the Iranian Supreme Leader. This led al-Hakim in 1990s to propose 
federalism to tackle the dual loyalties to Iraq and Iran according to which Iraq, 
Lebanon, Palestine and any other to-be Islamic state would be a federation affiliated 
to the Iranian Jurist Guardian (Visser, 2008). 
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After 23 years of Iranian exile, al-Hakim returned to his home city of Najaf on 
May 2003. Supported by the Iranian government, and backed by his religious 
legitimacy as an Ayatollah, he was "positioning himself as a contender for Shi'ite 
religious leadership in Iraq" (Nakash, 2003). He approached Sistani "in hope of 
uniting against the threat of the exclusivist and powerful Sadr Movement" (Cole, 
2003). His efforts were cut by his assassination in a huge bombing near the Shrine of 
Imam Ali in Najafin August 2003.  
There are many similarities between the ISCI and Lebanon‘s Hizbollah. Both 
follow the Iranian Guardian Jurist recognizing his 'worldly guardianship' while 
maintaining paramilitary branches. In addition, both parties, like the Muslim Brothers, 
temporarily postponed the goal of establishing the Islamic state in order to meet their 
own national needs and requirements (al-Sayf, 2006). Although the ISCI's leaders 
frequently announce that its military branch, the Badr Brigade, has been transformed 
into a civil organization, many believe that it still keeps its armed structures. Besides, 
large numbers of Badr's officers have been recruited in the new Iraqi Army and police 
forces. 
4. The Sadrists 
This movement was informally initiated during the 1990s by Ayatollah 
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr who is called al-Sadr II. After the fall of Baghdad in 2003, 
the movement emerged as an armed political movement with a young leadership. 
Although he is not Ayatollah, Muqtada al-Sadr inherited the loyalty of his father's 
followers who consisted mainly of poor, uneducated Shi'is.  
Today, the Sadrists have a foothold in Iraq anywhere there are ―recently 
urbanized, economically disadvantaged, socially marginalized, and politically 
disenfranchised Shiites. (Duss & Juul, 2009) 
This structure led the movement to maintain a xenophobic, exclusivist approach. 
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 Their antagonism to the secular middle class values of the Iraqi political and 
economic elite is often extreme, and has sometimes been expressed in the form of 
firebombing cinema houses and liquor shops, or at least threatening owners in an 
effort to make them close… it is hostile [also] to other Shi'ite religious forces. 
(Cole, 2003) 
The Sadrist movement emphasizes the Iraqi origin of their organization, a feature 
that attracted many Shi'i Iraqis, especially those who felt uncomfortable with the 
Persian domination in the Hawza. 
Al-Sadr has been the key figure to raise the issue of ―foreign origin‖ of several 
key Shiite clerics in Iraq, including Sistani (Iranian origin), Muhammad Ishaq 
Fayyad (Afghan), and Bashir Najafi (Pakistani). These charges are significant in 
that they represent a major effort to promote a ―nativist‖ approach to Shiite 
politics in Iraq that casts doubts on the appropriateness of religious leaders not of 
Iraqi blood. (Kemp, 2005, 4) 
The major source of power in the Sadrist arsenal is their paramilitary al-Mahdi 
Army, which undertook two major armed conflicts with the American troops in Najaf 
during 2004. Although the militia suffered devastating losses during these assaults, it 
still enjoys large numbers of organized and stand-by members; 
The Mahdi Army is thought to have nearly 60,000 members. Many Mahdi Army 
members also have infiltrated Iraq‘s security forces, particularly the local police 
and military rank-and-file. Despite this successful penetration, the Mahdi Army 
does not have ―control‖ over official Iraqi security forces to the same degree that 
ISCI‘s [previously SCIRI] Badr Organization militia might. (Duss & Juul, 2009) 
Although they were within the rejectionist alliance which boycotted the 
constitutional assembly elections in January 2005, the Sadrists participated in the 
subsequent poll in December of the same year within the Shi'i UIA list, wining 29 
seats (Duss & Juul, 2009). This about-face shift resulted from several factors, one of 
which was the influence of Ayatollah al-Sistani who sought to close the gap with this 
popular movement. Unlike other Ayatollahs in Najaf, al-Sistani has not publicly 
denounced Muqtada's actions but tried occasionally to approach him and convince 
him to adopt the 'political resistance' strategy adopted by other Shi'i factions such as 
the al-Da'wa and the ISCI.  
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Subsequent developments led Muqtada to withdraw from the UIA list and from 
the al-Maliki government, which in 2008 launched a mass military campaign against 
al-Mahdi Army in Baghdad, Basra, and Amarah. Although it was substantially 
degraded, the Sadrists "will remain, however, a serious potential threat to Iraq‘s long-
term stability if the movement is not sufficiently integrated into Iraq‘s governing 
structure." (Duss & Juul, 2009) 
Muqtada al-Sadr, like his father, is a determinant advocate of Walayat al-faqih 
theory within a framework that preserves Iraqi nationalism. 
Muqtada told him [the reporter] that he believes in the Khomeinist theory of the 
rule of the jurisprudent, but that the supreme jurisprudent of Iraq would be a 
different person than the supreme jurisprudent of Iran. (Cole, 2003) 
 Muqtada sought religious accreditation by considering Ayatollah Kazim al-
Ha'iri, a Qum-based disciple of al-Sadr I whom al-Sadr II nominated to succeed him, 
as the jurist of the movement while the latter appointed him as his highest rank Wakil 
in Iraq. This relationship was short-lived, as the two fell out in 2007. This further 
encouraged Muqtada to continue his religious education in Iran in order to attain the 
Ijtihad which would provide him with the theological legitimacy to lead the 
movement. By conducting his higher studies in Iran, Muqtada, however, has 
undermined the Iraqi identity of his movement and its political independence. 
5. Al-Fadhila Party 
Basra is the stronghold of this party which was founded after the war of 2003 by 
Ayatollah Muhammed al-Ya'qoubi. The party follows the ideology of al-Ya'qoubi's 
mentor Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (al-Sadr II) but does not recognize the leadership of 
his son Muqtada (Duss & Juul, 2009) which cause tensions, and sometimes clashes, 
with the Mahdi Army. The party experienced an overwhelming loss in the 2009 local 
elections. It advocates the establishment of the 'southern region' as a federal entity:   
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Fadhila‘s major political objective is the creation of a three-province ―southern 
region‖ incorporating Basra, Maysan, and Dhi Qar provinces. The idea of a 
―southern region‖ has percolated for decades and receives considerable support in 
Basra, but the idea places the party at odds with ISCI‘s desire for a nine-province 
―Shiastan‖ region. (Duss & Juul, 2009, 4) 
Al-Ya'qoobi believes that al-Fadhila Party should commit to the political process 
and elections but this democratic means represents the exception rather than the rule 
because the ultimate goal, according to him, is having the guardianship of the jurist 
over the state. 
The guardianship of jurists in The Shi'i political parties' manifestos  
The Saudi Shi'i activist and expert Tawfeeq al-Sayf classifies the present Shi'i 
political movements in the Middle East according to their Walayat al-faqih 
orientation into three groups: 
A. Those parties that believe in walayat al-faqih and affiliate to the Iranian Jurist 
Guardian Ali Khamana'i such as the group of Hizbollah in Lebanon and the 
Gulf and the ISCI in Iraq. 
B. Those movements that believe in a supervision-based role of the jurist on the 
grounds of the absolute guardianship theory or the conventional commitment 
to the marji’iyat but that do not affiliate to the Iranian Jurist Guardian, such as 
Munazzamat al-Amal al-Islami, al-Fadhila Party, the Sadrist Current, and the 
Bahranian Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami. 
C. Those organizations that are committed to the Shi'i religious framework 
without giving a specific role to jurists such as the al-Da‘wa Party in Iraq and 
Jam‘iyat al-Wifaaq al-Watani in Bahrain (al-Sayf, 2006) 
 
The Shi'i reformist movement in Saudi Arabia can be considered as an example 
of how some religious Shi'i parties could adopt a national agenda. Established in 
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1979, the movement followed Ayatollah Muhammad al-Shirazi who was one of the 
theorists of walayat al-faqih. It had been called the Organization of the Islamic 
Revolution in the 1980s and adopted a revolutionary agenda. In the 1990s, its leaders 
have decided to follow more realistic approach by negotiating with the Saudi 
authorities to establish a reconciliation pact. When al-Shirazi died in 2002, the leaders 
of the movement chose to follow Ayatollah al-Sistani who does not recognize the 
absolute guardianship of the jurist and, since then, it maintained a more national 
approach that distanced itself from foreign agendas (al-Sayf, 2006). 
 48 
 
 Jurist guardianship Leadership type 
Organizational 
orientation 
 
Party's 
jurist 
Absolute 
Shoura/ 
Elections 
Clerical 
Non-
clerical 
Revoluti-
onary 
Political/ 
democrat 
 
       
70s Al-Sadr I        
Shirazi       
Iran SL       
80s 
       
Shirazi       
       
Al-Ha'iri        
Iran SL       
90s 
       
Shirazi       
       
(Fadlallah)       
Al-Sadr II   
antenatal  antenatal  
Iran SL       
'00
- 
'05 
       
Mudarrisi       
Ya'qoobi       
Al-Ha'iri       
(al-Sistani)       
       
Iran SL        
2006
- 
now 
       
Mudarrisi       
Ya'qoobi       
Muqtada(?)       
(al-Sistani)       
       
 
- Hizbollah (82): many founder 
members came from Da'wa; (90s): 
abandoning the aim of the Islamic 
state. 
- SRM (90s): Reconciliation with 
Saudi regime; ('00): adopting Sistani's 
views 
- Da'wa (88): abolishing the Jurists 
Council (Hairi & Asafi) & fleeing 
Iran to Syria & UK. 
- Sadrists (2006-): the emergence of 
non-clerical young politicians 
- Ba'ath era (-1992): most parties are 
revolutionary. 
- Hizbollah (90s): involving in 
political system and abandoning 
using force internally (except in 
2008 Beirut clashes) 
 
MAI 
Da'wa Da'wa 
SCIRI 
Hizbolla 
MAI 
SRM 
Da'wa 
SCIRI 
Hizbolla 
MAI 
SRM 
Da'wa 
Sadrists 
SCIRI 
Hizbolla 
MAI 
Fadhila 
Sadrists 
SRM 
Da'wa 
Da'wa 
SCIRI 
Hizbolla 
MAI 
Fadhila 
Sadrists 
SRM 
MAI 
SCIRI 
Hizbolla 
MAI 
Dawa 
Hizbolla 
SCIRI 
Hizbolla 
MAI 
Da'wa 
Sadrists 
SCIRI 
Hizbolla 
MAI 
Fadhila 
Sadrists 
Da'wa 
SCIRI 
Hizbolla 
MAI 
Fadhila 
Sadrists 
Da'wa 
Da'wa 
MAI 
SCIRI 
SCIRI 
SCIRI 
SCIRI 
Hizbolla 
Hizbolla 
Hizbolla 
MAI 
MAI 
MAI 
MAI 
SRM 
SRM 
SRM 
SRM 
Dawa 
Dawa 
Dawa 
Dawa 
Sadrists 
Sadrists 
Sadrists 
SRM 
Table (1): the Shi'i political parties' positions and transformations  
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Chapter Four 
Al-Sistani and His Influence over the Iraqi Transition  
  
After examining the political role of Najaf Hawza in the previous chapter, the 
current section will shed light on the influence Ayatollah al-Sistani has exerted over 
the Iraqi politics focusing on the post-invasion era because he emerged as a key player 
in the critical Iraqi transition. To have clear insight about that, the chapter will 
initially introduce a biography to al-Sistani and elaborate on the post-khoi era in 
which al-Sistani's marji'iya was established. Afterward, a brief description of the post-
invasion governance in Iraq will be laid. 
Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani's biography 
Grand Ayatollah Sayid Ali Al-Husseini Al-Sistani was born in the holy city of 
Mashhad, in the northeast of Iran, on August 4, 1930, into a family known for its 
religious scholars.  The family originated in Sistan, in the southeastern province in 
Iran. He began his religious education to be Mujtahid by enrolling at 11 in a seminary 
for the preliminaries level. After finishing the second level of Sotouh, he moved, in 
1948, to Qum to join the prominent Shi'ite seminary, the Hawza of Qum, to pursue 
the bahth al-kharij (Noorbaksh, 2008; Khalaji, 2006; and www.sistani.org) 
After spending three years in Qum, Al-Sistani migrated to Najaf in 1951 where 
he attended the lectures of Ayatollah Abol-Qasim el-Khoi (1899-1992), who was 
considered "a prominent religious scholar and mujtahid, [and] one of the highest-
ranking religious authorities in the world of Shiite Islam." (Noorbaksh, 2008) A 
decade later, he was certified as mujtahid by Ayatollah Khoi and Ayatollah Hussein 
Al-Hilli, another leading Marja. In the same year, 1961, he left Najaf and returned to 
 50 
his hometown Mashhad to settle there but for unknown reasons he left one year later 
returning back to Najaf. Some argue that this return was in response to an order from 
Sistani's mentor, Ayatollah el-Khoi (Noorbaksh, 2008; Khalaji, 2006; 
www.sistani.org). 
Upon his return to Najaf, Ayatollah Sistani began researching and teaching 
Islamic jurisprudence. In about 1964, he began giving lectures in Bahth Al-Kharij. To 
date, he has taught these high jurisprudence courses for forty-five years. In 1987, 
Ayatollah Khoi assigned him to lead the prayers in Al-Khadra Mosque in Najaf where 
Khoi used to pray. Many then considered the move as an indication he "intended to 
groom Sistani for succession to Khoi" (Noorbaksh, 2008, 59).  
Ayatollah al-Sistani and the Hawza of Najaf in post-Kho'i era 
When Ayatollah Khoi passed away in Najaf in 1992, Ayatollah Abdel-A'ala al-
Savzivari had assumed the marji'iyat for a short period until his suspicious death in 
1993. Afterward, four Ayatollahs were candidates to succeed him as Marja al-a'ala, 
the supreme source of emulation: Ali al-Sistani, Murtadha Burujurdi, Ali al-Gharawi, 
and Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, father of Muqtada al-Sadr. Although 
many khubaraa', those who completed the outsider research, referred to him as the 
eminent marja, Sistani's religious leadership was not widely accepted in Najaf until 
Al-Sadr‘s assassination by the Saddam regime in 1998 (Khaliji, 2006, 8; Noorbaksh, 
2008). The relationship between the two Ayatollahs was not steady because it 
reflected the new-old conflict in the Hawza of Najaf between the activist Arab jurists 
and the quietist Iranians clerics. It highlighted another dimension of dispute, regarding 
the relation with the state, whereby Sistani represented the quietest cleric while al-
Sadr represented the activist one. Al-Sadr had made use of the anti-Iranian orientation 
of Saddam's regime to soften the heavy control of Iranian transnational networks over 
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the leadership and institutions in Najaf (Sa'eed, 2009). He created the two terms of al-
Hawza al-natiqa, the speaking Hawza, and al-Hawza al-sakita, the silent Hawza 
which reflected the longstanding dispute concerning the limits of jurists' guardianship. 
His son, Muqtada, raised the slogan of the speaking Hawza when he emerged in the 
postwar era. 
After the death of al-Savsivari, there were some indications that the regime was 
not in favor of Sistani's marjayat and preferred a friendly Iraqi marja. In 1993, the 
government shut down Khadra Mosque, where Sistani was leading prayers. In 1998, it 
launched a series of assassination attempts, in which two of Najaf's Iranian Grand 
Ayatollahs, Burujordi and al-Gharawi, were killed. In June of the same year, Sistani 
survived an unsuccessful assassination attempt in which two of his office employees 
were killed (Cole, 2003, 550). As a result, Sistani stopped teaching and barred casual 
visitors until 2003. Since the demise of Grand Ayatollah Kho'ie, the Iranian and Iraqi 
regimes had thus both tried to undermine the historical prominence of Najaf, but for 
different objectives (el-Labbad, 2008).  
Ayatollah al-Sadr II (a term Shi'is use to distinguish Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr 
from his cousin Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, often called al-Sadr I), had occasionally 
criticized Sistani in public for his 'silent' approach, considering that the only valid 
stand for a mujtahid is to "speak out against tyranny". The dispute was so polarizing 
that it provoked a deep split in the Shi'a community in Iraq which would, eventually, 
lead to the emergence of Muqtada al-Sadr's movement (Cole, 2003) 
After the assassination of al-Sadr II, the marji'iyat of Sistani became more 
recognized among the Iraqi Shi'is. Ayatollah Sistani has, according to his assistant 
Shahrestani, more than 2000 religious representatives worldwide. In addition, he has 
the support of Khoi's network of religious foundations and institutions, which is 
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administered by Kho'ie's sons and sons-in-law, who themselves initially supported 
Sistani to be their father's successor. Kho'ie's network was "the most established and 
expansive religious network in the world" (Khalaji, 2006,9).  
Regarding Sistani‘s popularity in the communities of Shi'ites around the world, 
many argue that he is "the most-followed marja in the Shi'ite world" (Khalaji, 2006, 
7). Besides, Sistani's office in Qum is the largest one in the holy city in terms of 
"financial capability and ownership of multiple institutions" while the offices of the 
other Najaf Ayatollahs in Qum are small ones (Khalaji, 2006, 7). Some clerical 
resources estimate that about 80% of devout Shi'is follow Ayatollah Sistani (Khalaji, 
2006).  
In Iran, the Ayatollah's son-in-law Shahrestani
(8)
 handles the complex task of 
balancing Sistani's position and interests with those of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali 
Khamanai.  The latter also claims that he is a marja, although most clerics have 
dismissed that claim (el-Labbad, 2008). After the demise of Ayatollah Khoi, who was 
considered the supreme marja of the Shi'is worldwide, Khamana'ei tried to assume 
this universal religious position or at least to prevent another Najaf-based cleric from 
taking it. To achieve this goal, the Irani association of Hawza teachers, a pro-
government organization, issued in 1994 a list of seven marjas, Khamana'ei included, 
requiring the Shi'is to emulate one of them. None of Najaf clerics were mentioned in 
the statement although some of them have followers in Iran (el-Labbad, 2008). 
In Iraq, Sistani lives in a modest home near the Shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf 
where he is visited by clerics, Wakils (his representatives), ordinary people, and 
officials. In the street where Sistani lives, the Iranian government has bought many 
houses "in the name of various individuals over the last three years, permitting Iranian 
ministry of intelligence and Revolutionary Guard members to surround Sistani‘s 
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street" (Khalaji, 2006). Concerning managing Ayatollah Sistani's institutions in Najaf, 
Mahdi Khalaji states: 
His office in Najaf is headed by his son Muhammad Reza Sistani, but observers 
believe that Muhammad Reza is not an important consultant to his father. He 
does his job as a head of Ali Sistani‘s administration in Najaf, but in political 
issues, Mohammad Reza does not have much influence on his father. Sistani‘s 
main consultants in political issues are Javad Shahrestani, his son-in-law in Qom; 
Hamid al-Khaffaf, his only official spokesman and his only nonclerical 
representative in Beirut; Murteza Kashmiri, his son-in-law in London; 
Muhammad Reza, as his main mediator to the Iraqi government; and Ahmad Safi 
and Dr. Hossein Shahrestani [the current Iraqi Minister of Oil]." (Khalaji, 2006, 
12) 
Some scholars consider al-Sistani's religious network to be the largest Shi'i 
transnational organization in Iraq: 
the grand ayatollah oversees a loyal body of activists, students, ministers, 
representatives, and wakils (agents) who operate and administer his vast, 
multimillion-dollar transnational network of seminaries, mosques, and welfare-
based organizations from India to Nigeria, from London to New York, and from 
Qom to Najaf, arguably representing the most organized religious association in 
post-Ba‘athist Iraq.(Rahimi, 2007) 
Besides al-Sistani, there are several mujtahids, Ayatollahs, in Najaf Hawza but 
there are only two Grand Ayatollahs who are Ayatollah al-Fayaadh and al-Hakim. 
Both have friendly relationship with Ayatollah al-Sistani and they occasionally meet 
to discuss major developments.  
1- Ayatollah Muhammad Is'haaq al-Fayaadh.  
He is from Afghani origin and holds a Pakistani nationality while his family 
resides in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. He is considered one of the 
prominent disciples of the former G. A. al-Khoe'i and many believe he is the highest 
Ayatollah, after al-Sistani, measured in terms of purely academic standards. At the 
same time, because the supreme marja in Najaf has always been either Iranian or 
Iraqi, al-Fayaadh's chances to assume the marji'iyat in post-al-Sistani era are weak 
(Khalaji, 2005; IKC, 2009).  
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Al-Sadr II advised his followers to emulate al-Fayaadh after him but when 
Muqtada al-Sadr approached him after the assassination of his father, Ayatollah al-
Fayaadh refuse to be the jurist of the Sadrists, urging Muqtada to abandon politics and 
focus instead on his classes in the Hawza (from the writer‘s personal observation). In 
the post-invasion era, most of Ayatollah al-Fayaadh's positions were conformed to 
that of al-Sistani (www.alfayadh.com).  
2- Ayatollah Muhammad Sa'eed al-Hakim. 
He is from the family of al-Hakim which has religious and political influence 
over Iraq. He has strong a relationship with Ammar al-Hakim and his ISCI party. 
Although he is not an advocate of the absolute guardianship of jurist, his relatives' 
involvement in political and economic activities affected his religious authority. He is 
said to be emulated by about 5% of the Iraqi Shi'i devotes. However, he is the only 
Arab Grand Ayatollah in Najaf seminary and, unlike the other two Grand Ayatollahs 
al-Sistani and al-Fayaadh, can deliver his communications in clear Arabic. 
The guardianship of jurist in al-Sistani's views  
As discussed previously, Shi'is scholars are divided into two groups in the debate 
of the role of jurists in public affairs. Traditional Ayatollahs, such as Khoi, Muhsin al-
Hakim, and Muhammed Kazim al-Yazdi, advocated a limited role for marjas in 
public life whereby a jurist has a specified guardianship only over maintaining the 
religious judiciary, managing endowments, and taking care of orphans with limited, 
occasional interventions. On the other hand, reformist and activist clerics argue that 
marjas' guardianship is practiced over a wide range of communal and governing 
affairs,  meaning that the marja who has specific scholarly and political qualifications 
has a guardianship over the state and society. Ayatollah Khomaini is the marja who 
brought the second theory, the absolute guardianship of jurist, into full practice, 
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establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ayatollahs Khomaini and Khoe'i 
approaches represent the most extreme articulations in the Shi'i scholar community on 
the two sides of the debate. Many Ayatollahs, though believing in the guardianship of 
jurist, argue that such a guardianship is not absolute or it is practiced collectively by 
all the Shi'i marjas at any given time, as the Qum-based Gulbygani said, or by a board 
of Ayatollahs, as argued by Ayatollah Muhammad al-Shirazi (el-Labbad, 2008). 
Ayatollah Sistani's views regarding the role of religion in state cannot be easily 
classified. In this regard, Noorbaksh comments that: 
Sistani‘s seclusion from politics, particularly in the 1990s and the decades of 
Baathist totalitarian rule, has added to the mystery of, and confusion over, his 
views on the relationship between religion and state. During these years, his 
bayan (communiqués) were directed primarily to Shiite communities outside Iraq 
and dealt mostly with religious questions remote from the scope of politics… His 
silence on the domestic politics of Iraq and the relationship between Islam and 
the state created a misperception, leading some to label him as 
―quietist‖.(Noorbaksh, 2008,60) 
Noorbaksh believes that "with a close examination of his life, one can understand 
that Sistani is anything but passive or quietist when it comes to the current state of 
politics in Iraq." He cites as evidence the Najaf meeting that accommodated Sistani 
with Abdol-Aziz Sachedina, a reformist scholar on Shi'a Islam, in which the 
Ayatollah insisted on the primacy of the marja on matters related to the religion and 
politics of Muslim society. This opinion indicates that this Ayatollah is far from being 
a passive or quietist marja (Noorbaksh, 2008; Allawi, 2007). 
Ali Allawi, the former Iraqi Minister of Defense and Finance, argues that, 
differing from Ayatollah Khoi, Sistani adopted a 'third road' between quietism and 
Walayat al-Faqih as applied in Iran: 
Sistani emerges as someone who is vitally concerned with the role of Islam in 
state and society, and one who does not advocate a benign negligence or 
avoidance of all things to do with the state or government. (Allawi, 2007, 209) 
Noorbaksh emphasizes this argument as he concludes that "he [Sistani] favors the 
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direct influence of the clergy over the state, with the intention that this institution of 
power and enforcement could protect religion and the Islamic identity of the 
community of the faithful… So far, what we know about Sistani is that he is in favor 
of a different version of velayat-e faqih in Iraq, one that mostly oversees but does not 
directly participate in the running of a government." (Noorbaksh, 2008, 61) 
We have to distinguish here between 'the direct influence' and 'the direct 
participation' of the clergy in the state that Noorbaksh mentions. So, both Ali Allawi 
and Noorbaksh, and most scholars, deny that the Grand Ayatollah Sistani is in favor 
of a direct role of clerics in the state.  
Other scholars argue that al-Sistani's approach conforms with that of former Shi'i 
Marjas who chose to pursue 'occasional interventions' to preserve the welfare of the 
Muslim community, citing as examples Ayatollah Burujordi of Qum, Muhsin al-
Hakim of Najaf, and even the tobacco fatwa of al-Shirazi in 1891, none of which 
prevented those mujtahids from continuing their spiritual leadership of the 
community. Most of al-Sistani's interventions in Iraqi political affairs, according to 
this opinion, were during the period of 2003-2004, during which the political 
framework was being set, and since then he has returned to maintaining traditional 
clerical tasks with very few political announcements (Visser, 2006). 
It is an approach that is neither completely quietist nor bureaucratic in the 
extreme. Instead, it rests on charismatic (but often low-key and subtle) power and 
the ability of the leading Shiite clerics to interfere at selected junctures, … These 
junctures are not chosen randomly; they tend to materialise if the mujtahid 
monopoly of Usuli Shiism is under threat, or if local intervention can serve to 
promote the career of a traditionalist cleric without detracting from his standing 
in the wider international world of Shiism. Conversely, should clerical 
involvement in politics directly pose risks to the integrity of religious precincts 
(like those of Najaf), or to the more basic religious role of the clergy, the ulama 
may well opt to stay quiet for that reason. (Visser, 2006) 
On the other hand, some observers considered al-Sistani's calls for the Shariy'a to 
be the principal source of legislation as an indication of his willingness to impose 
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religious guardianship over the society. Rahimi opposes this argument stating that: 
Because Sistani approved the constitution in October 2005, he has already given 
consent to article 2 of the charter of the constitution, which not only explicitly 
recognizes Islam as a source of legislation but also prohibits passing laws that 
violate the principles of democracy in terms of individual rights and freedoms. 
For many, article 2 is a contradiction in terms. But for Sistani, the article actually 
articulates the most legitimate form of political authority. (Rahimi, 2007, 11) 
 Rahimi goes on to argue that al-Sistani is an advocate of an Islamic democracy 
in which democratic liberties serve Islam's objectives; 
According to the school of thought to which the grand ayatollah adheres, the 
principles of democracy, such as political participation, competition, 
accountability, and accessibility, not only do not contradict Islam but, in fact, 
reinforce it. As he participated in the constitution-making process by calling for a 
directly and popularly elected constitution drafting council in November 2003, 
Sistani feels that the constitution is a way to reaffirm popular sovereignty, 
reflective of Islamic norms of virtue and justice. (Rahimi, 2007, 11) 
Rahimi then tries to distinguish al-Sistani's approach from that of the Islamists, 
arguing that: 
It is crucial not to confuse the Islamist conception of the constitution with 
Sistani‘s constitutional notion of Islamic democracy: whereas the Islamists seek 
to bring the state into total conformity with an Islamic legal system, Sistani aims 
to accommodate Islamic law along with other legal norms of various social and 
political significances in daily life. (Rahimi, 2007, 11) 
This may contradict, to some extent, with the thesis of Reidar Visser who refers 
to a transnational policy behind the Ayatollah's actions: 
While the Iraqi clergy has no intention of following the Khomenist model of 
direct involvement in governance, it is nevertheless unwilling to abdicate all 
authority related to political matters. Iraq‘s Shiite clergy seeks to exercise power 
over Iraqi politics from outside the system to both exercise a veto power above 
the law of the land and to preserve its claim to a pan-Shia system that transcends 
the borders of modern states. This stance makes the Iraqi Shiite clergy, 
paradoxically, both deeply invested in the current state system and a non-state 
player par excellence. (Visser, 2009, 1) 
To support his argument, Visser mentions three positions of al-Sistani in post-
constitution era, which demonstrate the quietist approach, to highlight al-Sistani‘s 
quest to act as a decisive non-state player; 
First, in April 2006, an interventionist strain in Sistani‘s communication appeared 
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once more, as he signaled to the incoming Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, 
that the ulama would ―keep an eye‖ on and ―monitor‖ the performance of the 
government. Second, after a subsequent meeting in September 2006, the leading 
Shiite cleric expressed concern about the security situation and the failure to 
create an Iraqi army on a truly national basis. Third, after an even longer interval 
of silence, Sistani once more emerged in the Iraqi political debate in November of 
2008, as the Iraqi parliament was discussing the Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) with the United States. 
The last stand, according to Visser, is the most critical one. Al-Sistani's bayan 
stated two criteria for the passage of the agreement in the Council of Representatives, 
neither of which conforms to the Constitution, which the Ayatollah himself endorsed. 
It also reflects how this "non-state player had intervened in state politics with the 
expectation that he would be listened to regardless of what the constitution said." 
(Visser, 2009) 
Visser then compares and contrasts the decisive role of the Iraqi Shi'i clergy with 
that of Iran in the context of the recent Iranian political development: 
when some Iranian oppositionists dream of a ‗Sistani alternative‘ in their own 
domestic politics, featuring a pliant, ritual-oriented clergy—a vision that came to 
the fore once more after the disputed June 2009 presidential elections—such 
oppositionists engage in a high degree of wishful thinking. Rather, today Iraqi 
Islamists claim that the Iraq-based clergy exercises a stronger influence over Iraqi 
politics than their Iranian counterparts, precisely because they remain outside of 
institutions when they enter politics. (Visser, 2009, 8) 
 
The governance of Iraq in post-invasion era 
The occupation of Iraq by the US-led coalition in 2003 has brought about crucial 
challenges to the country's governance. It initiated an unprecedented vacuum in 
governing legitimacy, power monopoly, and institutional structures. After toppling 
Saddam's regime, the US government and its allies established the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) as the entity responsible for governing Iraq and setting 
its political framework. The CPA ruled Iraq from May 2003 until June 2004, headed 
by Paul Bremer III, a senior American Ambassador (Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004, 14).  
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On May 16, 2003, Bremer issued CPA order No.1 according to which he 
disbanded the Ba'ath Party (Hassan, 2007).  In the same month, Bremer issued his 
order No.2, dissolving the Iraqi army, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of 
Interior, the Ministry of Media, and all security agencies which supported Saddam's 
regime (Hassan, 2007). This step provoked, especially later on, substantial criticism 
from some Iraqis and American experts, who claimed that it contributed to the 
subsequent widespread violence.  
In July 2003, US established the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which consisted 
of 25 appointees selected from among Iraqi politicians, most of whom were émigrés 
during the rule of the Ba'ath regime. This step was a response to the urgent need to 
have an Iraqi political body at least nominally charged with the governance of the 
country. However, the IGC barely represented an advisory council to the CPA 
(Papagiani, 2007, 260). The suggestions of the UN to widen the IGC by including 
representatives from non-exile personalities, including greater Sunni representation, 
were ignored by the CPA. 
The most significant, and controversial, outcome of the IGC-CPA partnership 
was the Agreement of Political Process signed on November 15, 2003, which later led 
to the formulation of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). This agreement 
drew up the framework within which Iraq‘s new democratic structure would be 
established leading up to approval of a new Constitution. In fact, the CPA was the real 
architect of the TAL as "the final draft was entirely unavailable until the actual 
signing, and was thus exposed to no criticism until the five Shi'ite members of the 
Governing Council threatened not to sign the document." (Papagiani, 2007, 261) 
In June 2004, the CPA handed over the authority to an interim government 
appointed by the CPA, with some input from the IGC and the UN. The new 
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government was headed by Dr. Ayad Allawi, an ex-Ba'athist and Shi'ite politician 
long resident outside the country (Hassan, 2007). Along with the interim government, 
the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) was formed and its members selected 
based on a caucus system. Both the Interim Government of Allawi and the TNA were 
assigned to administer the country and maintain the institutions required for the 
election of the constitutional assembly, but without authority to sign security pacts or 
any other strategic mandates. 
In 2005, Iraq held two national elections and a referendum over the constitution. 
Many scholars believe that the transition process was not sufficiently inclusive and 
pluralistic whether in formulating the IGC, writing the TAL, forming the Interim 
Government and the Transitional National Assembly, or drafting the constitution. The 
main factor that had led to such an outcome was the desire of the CPA to control the 
process and conclude it within a short timetable (Arato, 2004; Papagiani, 2005).  
On January 30, 2005, the election of the National Assembly was held. Boycotted 
by most Sunni Arabs, the elections resulted in a parliament controlled by the United 
Iraqi Alliance (a Shi'a bloc), which formed a governmental coalition. Under a strict 
timetable, the parliament's Constitutional Committee drafted a constitution on which a 
referendum was organized on October 14, 2003. Although two Sunni provinces voted 
against it by two-thirds majority, the constitution has been adopted. Accordingly, 
another national election was held on December 15 in the same year but to elect four-
year parliament. The same Shi'i-led alliance won the vote but without having the 
absolute majority (Hassan, 2007; Papagiani, 2007). 
Sistani's marji'iyat in post-war Iraq 
After the toppling of the Ba'ath regime in 2003, Ayatollah Sistani emerged as a 
central player in the new Iraq. His religious legitimacy in Shi'ite communities, along 
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with his sophisticated network, has given him an exceptional capability to mobilize 
Shi'ite communities. His transnational religious network
9
 represents an independent 
and integrated governance system that not only administers the clergy-related affairs 
but extends to provide services that the state usually performs. 
Since the fall of Saddam, the Sistani network has emerged as the most organized 
transnational civic institution in Iraq, with offices not only throughout Iraq, but 
also in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Britain, Georgia, India, Iran, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the United States… The 
seminary students [in Iran] supported by Sistani‘s center are well paid and are 
even offered a health insurance plan that covers their families during the period 
of their studies. (Rahimi, 2007, 7) 
As noted above, this transnational network is funded mainly by the khums as well 
as other financial resources, such as endowments and merchants' and pilgrimages' 
donations. 
Noorbaksh refers to other factors that led to the ability of Ayatollah Sistani to 
lead Iraqi Shi'is: 
The only remaining leader capable of bringing all Iraqis into the fold was 
Ayatollah Ali Sistani. He could deliver for a community [of Shi'a] that had been 
under-represented, isolated and discriminated against in the government and 
politics of Iraq from the time of the British occupation of the country. 
(Noorbaksh, 2008, 58) 
When the US-led coalition overthrew the Saddam regime, most Iraqi Shiites were 
"facing a historical opportunity, and challenge, to transform Iraqi history in their own 
favor." (Noorbaksh, 2008, 60) They saw in Sistani their wise leader who would guide 
them through this critical stage. 
Politically, many scholars and commentators argue that Ayatollah has been "the 
most powerful person" (Arato, 2004) in Iraq at least in the Shi'ite community. With 
the assassination of Ayatollah Baqir Al-Hakim and the decline in Muqtada Al-Sadr‘s 
popularity, this conclusion became even stronger.  
Al-Sistani's emergence in the post-Ba'ath era, gave some hope to the Najafi 
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clerics to restore the leading status that Najaf had lost to Qum. The religious 
establishment that the Ayatollah supervises is said to be large enough to realize this 
objective: 
With an approximate income of $ US 5 million a month in form of donations 
from countries like India, Iran, Lebanon and Pakistan, the Najaf-based Sistani 
organization is growing with the ongoing transition of the Iraqi government. 
Accordingly, as more pilgrims make their way to the holy cities, the Ayatollah‘s 
income is also likely to grow. For the most part, Sistani remains as the 
preeminent and best financed of the major Ayatollahs remaining in the city of 
Najaf, and, by extension, in Iraq. (Rahimi, 2005) 
 
The influence of Ayatollah Sistani over the Constitution-making process 
The first step of the CPA in shaping Iraq's future democratic roadmap was the 
establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) which consisted of 25 members 
appointed by Paul Bremer based on sectarian background. The council basically 
represented a consultant board to the head of the CPA (Papiagani, 2007). Ayatollah 
Sistani adopted a 'no comment' policy toward this vitally important American action 
(www.sistani.org).  
When the CPA declared its plans to form a constitutional assembly based on a 
caucus system, Ayatollah issued his fatwa denouncing the step and requiring fully 
representative elections. Moreover, part of the CPA's plan was to "rely on a group of 
American experts to draft the Iraqi constitution." (Papagiani, 2007, 260) Sistani's 
fatwa spelled out his opposition to this approach: 
These [occupation] authorities do not have the authority to appoint the members 
of the constitution writing council. There is no guarantee that this council will 
produce a constitution that responds to the paramount interests of the Iraqi people 
and expresses its national identity of which Islam and noble social values are 
basic components. The [constitution writing] proposal is fundamentally 
unacceptable. There must be general elections in which each eligible Iraqi can 
choose his representative in a constituent assembly for writing the constitution. 
This is to be followed by a general referendum on the constitution approved by 
the constituent assembly. All believers must demand the realization of this 
important issue and participate in completing the task in the best manner. 
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(www.sistani.org; translated in Arato, 2004, 1) 
This fatwa, or edict, was issued in June 25, 2003. In the subsequent months, the 
office of Sistani in Najaf answered several written interviews by leading American 
and European journals in a step that was unusual taking into account his 'anti-media' 
policy. The Grand Ayatollah repeated the same demand in all these interviews, adding 
that the United Nations is the only "legitimate non-Iraqi body that could expedite a 
democratic election" (Noorbaksh, 2008). According to Babak Rahimi, the Grand 
Ayatollah resisted the caucus system for two reasons: 
First and foremost, according to Sistani, the caucuses system was not built around 
a ―one man, one vote‖ paradigm that would immediately empower ordinary Iraqis 
to participate directly in the election of official representatives. Second, the non-
popular electoral system, regulated and organized by a foreign occupying force, 
would make the transition process illegitimate and even ―treasonable‖ in the eyes 
of both the religious establishment and ordinary Iraqis. Sistani viewed direct 
popular elections ―with an acceptable level of transparency and legitimacy‖ as 
essential to forming a democratic Iraq; a caucuses system would only lead to the 
transfer from one illegitimate government to another. (Rahimi, 2007, 8-9) 
In November 15, 2003, the CPA and IGC signed the ―Agreement on Political 
Process,‖ which represented a road map towards approving a permanent constitution 
but without abandoning the caucus system as a means of forming the transitional 
assembly that would presumably hand over sovereignty to the elected constitutional 
assembly. Andrew Arato described this agreement as being imposed in "a coup-like 
fashion"; along with its insistence on the caucus method, the agreement gave "all the 
crucial tasks, and not only ultimate authority, to the two contracting parties 
themselves [CPA and IGC]. The task of creating the un-amendable body of rules, 
variously referred to as the ‗fundamental law‘ or the interim constitution or the 
‗transitional administrative law,‘ was given to the current IGC itself, 'in close 
consultation with the CPA'." (Arato, 2004, 2)  
After a few days, Ayatollah Sistani issued an announcement denouncing the 
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agreement and repeating his original demand to have a freely-elected constitutional 
council as "the only acceptable entity to which sovereignty could be transferred by the 
CPA." (Arato, 2004, 3) 
After many attempts by the CPA and the IGC to compromise on the demands of 
Sistani, or work around them, the Ayatollah urged his followers to protest against the 
caucus-based American plan and to ask for immediate elections. The clerics of the 
Hawza began disseminating the opinions of Sistani mainly through religious forums 
and mosques, organizing a Shi'ite front against the American plans. Consequently, 
tens of thousands of Shi'ite Iraqis came out onto the streets of Basra, Najaf, Baghdad, 
and other Shi'ite-majority cities for five days supporting the fatwa and demanding 
direct elections (Nasr, 2006; Rahimi, 2007). 
After being convinced by the UN officials that it would be impossible to conduct 
immediate elections, Ayatollah Sistani agreed to put off such elections until late 2004. 
Eventually, the CPA and IGC gave in to his call for general elections to select the 
constitutional assembly (Rahimi, 2007). However, they came up with a twist under 
which they, the CPA and IGC, would issue the Transitional Administrative Law 
(TAL), which represented a de facto temporary constitution that was also intended to 
be a blueprint to the permanent constitution. The grand Ayatollah immediately issued 
an announcement condemning the TAL because it was issued by an un-elected 
assembly and requiring the to-be elected assembly not to be constrained by this TAL. 
The major shift in the initial plan of the CPA in response to Sistani‘s pressure 
was to move the task of drafting the Constitution from a caucus-based constitutional 
convention to a directly elected constitutional assembly. The security situation and the 
pressure of Ayatollah Sistani were significant factors behind this policy change. Arato 
argues that:  
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Under the impact of the expanding military insurgency, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority came to understand that it could not simultaneously take on both the 
armed Sunnis [that] its destruction of the Iraqi state [had] forced underground and 
the immense masses that would rally to the call of the leading Shi'ite clerics of 
Najaf (Arato, 2004, 1).  
Besides, Shi'ite members in the IGC did not want to fall out with Ayatollah 
Sistani. In addition, the CPA faced a critical challenge that "Either it accepted an 
elected body that might not prove amenable to its pressures, or it had to face the 
possibility of rejection of the constitution if it were produced by an appointed group." 
(Allawi, 2007, 211) 
On the other hand, the CPA and IGC had succeeded in imposing a set of rules on 
the permanent Constitution through limiting it by particular conditions embedded in 
the TAL, opposing Sistani's demand that the elected constitutional assembly be free of 
any pre-requirements. One article that was publicly denounced by Sistani was the veto 
that was given to the Kurds 
(10)
 in the process of ratifying and amending the 
constitution (Papagiani, 2007). 
The role of Shariy'a in the Constitution 
Ayatollah Sistani's opinion regarding the role of Shariy'a in the Iraqi constitution 
falls in the center of the heated debate about the relation between Islam and the state. 
Although many had described him as an apolitical, quietest cleric, the Grand 
Ayatollah has shown a distinctive approach since 2003. Answering a question by 
Antony Shadeed, a Washington Post reporter, about the Ayatollah's opinion regarding 
the position of Islam in the constitution, he stated that "Islam is the religion of the 
majority in Iraq, and if the constitution is written by those whom Iraqis elected, it 
would definitely respect Islam's values and its paramount teachings" 
(www.sistani.org). 
The interpretations of Sistani's fatwas in this regard vary from one scholar to 
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another. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard argues that the Grand Ayatollah is "preferring an 
explicitly Islamic state but with clerics remaining outside politics (Ali al-Sistani), 
[rather than] preferring a more Iran-style theocracy (ISCI)" (Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004, 
17). He supported his argument by stating that, 
While Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani has said that the constitution should guarantee 
individual liberties, it was with the caveat that such have to be consistent "with 
the religious facts and the social values of the Iraqi people." (Kurrild-Klitgaard, 
2004, 17) 
But advocating an 'Islamic state' was not evidently clear in Sistani's 
announcements and fatwas. Practically, the Ayatollah has not protested the approved 
Constitution but, rather, urged his followers to approve it (Noorbaksh, 2008) which 
was what in fact happened in October 2005. The Iraqi Constitution cannot be said to 
facilitate an 'Islamic state' as argued by Kurrild-Klitgaard because Article 2 stated that 
Shariy'a is a source of legislation and that prohibits issuing any law that contradicts 
with democratic principles (Rahimi, 2007). This fact is in stark contradiction with 
Noorbaksh's conclusion that Ayatollah Sistani "favors the direct influence of the 
clergy over the state" (Noorbaksh, 2008, 61). 
Rahimi, in turn, argues that Ayatollah Sistani, like his father, is an advocate of a 
"democratic Shi'ite tradition" that belongs to the Constitutional Revolution of Iran 
(1906-1911); the same tradition that was articulated by the reformist movement of 
Khatami, the former Iranian president (Rahimi, 2007). 
Allawi believes, in accordance with Kurrild-Klitgaard, that Sistani is substantially 
concerned with the role of religion, Islam, in both state and society but in the sense 
that the state is vital for protecting Islam; however, he argues that this is "a far cry 
from demanding the direct rule of the ulema as a precondition to ensuring the Islamic 
identity of the country" (Allawi, 2007, 209). So, he argues that the Ayatollah's 
approach is more sophisticated than the crude classifications of 'activist' and 'quietest' 
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clerics. 
On the other hand, the approval of 2005 Constitution by al-Sistani, cast some 
suspicions about the Grand Ayatollah's intentions as the document poses critical 
threats to the unity of the country and the sectarian tensions (Visser, 2006). Endorsing 
the Constitution may have been the best of the worse due to the complex situation 
Iraq had been through. Grand Ayatollah Al-Fayadh, the other marja in Najaf, admitted 
in his fatwa, in which he called for approving the constitution, that the draft does not 
sufficiently reflect Iraq's "Islamic position and its outstanding religious civilization" 
but, he added, it guarantees the minimum level of the Iraqi people's ambitions. In 
addition, al-Fayadh stated that this document was the best possible outcome in the 
international and regional context (www.alfayadh.com). 
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Chapter Five 
Case studies and Prospects for the Future 
In this chapter, an analysis of al-Sistani‘s influence over the Iraqi transition will 
be laid in three case studies; constitution-making process, rule of law, and clerics as 
electoral candidates. In the first case study, the research will examine the relevant 
events in chronological order. The second case will be analyzed in the period before 
Samarra bombings and that after them. The impact of Ayatollah al-Sistani‘s fatwas 
that prohibit clerics from assuming political positions will be examined in the third 
case. 
In addition to the case studies, the present research will analyze the prospects of 
the doctrinal and political conflict between the Iranian walayat al-faqih and the neo-
quietist approach of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. 
 
The role and influence of Ayatollah al-Sistani over the transition 
I. Constitution-Making process 
The Constitution-making process may be seen as comprised of the major political 
decisions, orders, and procedures that led to the approval of the permanent 
Constitution in October 2005. Below is a chronological series of the related political 
developments: 
1. The founding of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) 
 
The position of Ayatollah al-Sistani 
He neither recognized the council nor denounced it but rather followed a no-
comment-policy in answering the media's related questions (al-Khaffaf, 2006, Doc 
20/1 & 2; Doc 21/1; Doc 22/1, Doc 27/3, Doc 41/5). However, he once emphasized 
that the IGC must only administer the country's day-to-day affairs as per security and 
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services and prepare for the Constitutional Assembly's election demanded by al-
Sistani without becoming involved in setting any strategic agreement or decision (Al-
Khaffaf, 2006, Doc 41/5). 
Analysis of the positions of the relevant players: 
Iran  
The government of Iran had immediately recognized the IGC as a legitimate Iraqi 
authority, which was an initial pragmatic step to engage more in Iraqi affairs 
irrespective of the American control over the whole process. Taking into account that 
most of the Shi'i organizations represented in the IGC (such as ISCI and al-Da'wa) 
have good relations with Tehran, the Iranian engagement provides decisive influence 
over the Iraqi transition through which the Tehran Ayatollahs envisaged furthering 
many goals such as balancing the American influence in the short-run and 
establishing a subordinate Shi'i federation in southern Iraq. 
Many factors may have been considered by Ayatollah al-Sistani and led him to 
silence about the establishing of the IGC, which contrasted with his calls for having a 
freely elected assembly. One factor is the immediate recognition by Iran. Sistani's 
huge network of institutions, seminaries, and residential compounds in Iran have been 
under the authority of the Supreme Leader and thus any conflict between the two 
leading clerics, Khamanai and Sistani, over the situation in Iraq would inevitably 
threaten Sistani's interests in Iran, a situation that would jeopardize his then-emerging 
worldly marji'iyat.  
IGC members 
They had behaved as a completely legitimate and sovereign authority although 
they lacked both qualities. Moreover, they signed two critical agreements, the APP 
and TAL; both are strategic and affected the elected constitutional assembly and the 
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to-be Constitution.  
The CPA  
In principle, this step went against the repeated demands of al-Sistani to have a 
freely elected assembly but in practice it established a Shi'i-majority council of 
governance for the first time in Iraq for centuries. In addition, the CPA ensured that 
Islamist Shi'i figures close to the Ayatollah would participate in the IGC. In particular, 
the ISCI under the leadership of Ayatollah al-Hakim was then an ally to al-Sistani 
especially after the latter's announcement that the absolute guardianship of jurist 
cannot be implemented in Iraq. In addition, the emergence of al-Sadr movement urged 
the Grand Ayatollah to ally with al-Hakim as a moderate, reasonable leader to balance 
al-Sadr's radical power. These facts may have contributed to al-Sistani's silence policy 
towards the CPA's step.  
UNAMI (the UN mission in Iraq) 
The role of Sergio De Milo, the UNAMI's Head, was essential in giving the IGC 
some real authority, more than the advisory one that Bremer envisaged, and as having 
the right to appoint and oversee a 25-member cabinet, although the latter reported 
ultimately to Paul Bremer.  
2. The Agreement of Political Process (APP), (signed by the CPA and IGC in 
Nov. 15, 2003) 
 
The position of Ayatollah al-Sistani 
The Ayatollah expressed two reservations over the APP. Firstly, it stipulated the 
issuance of the Transitional Administrative Law by the IGC and CPA which does not 
give it the legitimacy; so, it must be ratified by the elected assembly to be legitimate. 
Secondly, the embedded mechanism of the caucus system to establish the 
Constitutional Assembly does not guarantee having a fully representative parliament, 
which can be realized only through free elections (al-Khaffaf, 2006, Doc 43 and 46).  
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Analyzing the positions of the relevant players 
The CPA 
The CPA officials expected that al-Sistani would be satisfied because in the APP 
they abandoned their initial plan of drafting the constitution by a caucus-based 
assembly in consultations with an American expert body. However, the Grand 
Ayatollah recognized that the Fundamental Law, the APP's name of the to-be TAL, 
would be the base to the permanent Constitution. It is noteworthy,  though, that the 
Ayatollah al-Sistani did not denounce the plan as a whole but rather spelled out two 
reservations. In addition, he did not make an immediate announcement but instead the 
reservations were recorded in written interviews with the Washington Post's reporters 
about ten days after issuing the agreement. In general, this agreement signaled a major 
shift in the US-led CPA's policy in Iraq from the initial plan of having a group of Iraqi 
experts, supported by American advisors, drafting the constitution into adopting a 
mechanism according to which a directly elected assembly would draft the 
Constitution. The influence of Ayatollah al-Sistani's position was quite clear in this 
transformation of the plans of the CPA. 
The IGC members 
The Shi'i members of the IGC, besides Jalal Talabani, acted as messengers, and to 
some extent intermediaries, between the CPA head Paul Bremer and Ayatollah al-
Sistani in the period prior to the signing of the APP because the latter was not meeting 
any American officials at that tiime. Some of those mediators were not accurate, 
deliberately or not, in communicating the Ayatollah's views to Bremer and the 
reverse. This opinion was expressed by Paul Bremer and the office of Ayatollah al-
Sistani. However, this does not adequately interpret the continued dispute between the 
two major parties, al-Sistani and the CPA, because it was not a matter of poor 
 72 
communication but rather an issue of a strategic conflict over the shape of the 
prospective constitution and governance system. 
3. The signing of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) 
The position of Ayatollah al-Sistani 
The Grand Ayatollah denounced the TAL on several occasions, arguing that it 
would put many obstacles in the road to having a permanent constitution that would 
preserve Iraq's unity and Iraqis‘ rights (al-Khaffaf, 2006, Doc 57). He also 
pronounced that the law will restrict the authority of the upcoming National Assembly 
to issue what it sees appropriate to the Iraqi interests or, that is, an elected body would 
be restricted by an unelected council's decisions, a situation that would make the 
elections meaningless or nearly so. Moreover, al-Sistani threatened to boycott the UN 
mission in Iraq if the Security Council mentioned the TAL in its next resolution about 
Iraq (al-Khaffaf, 2006, Doc 58). Considering the style of al-Sistani's previous 
announcements, the tone of his statements about the TAL was aggressive and 
challenging. Most of his previous pronouncements were in response to his followers' 
questions or that of the media while his pronouncements about the TAL were self-
initiated. He may have felt that the CPA was moving around his major demand of a 
free elected Constitutional Assembly which, I believe, was the case.  
The CPA 
Rather than having a semi-appointed Constitutional Assembly depending on 
caucuses, the CPA managed to fix, in advance, a set of rules, the TAL, which would 
be the blueprint to the permanent Constitution. Bremer came up with this twist in 
which he apparently realized al-Sistani's demand of having a constitution written by 
an elected body but in practice he drew up the framework for such an assembly.  
The IGC members 
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Although some of the Shi'i members of the IGC worked hard to convince the 
other members and the CPA to change some articles in the initial draft that were 
opposed by Ayatollah al-Sistani and succeeded in some, they finally signed the 
document although they knew it was still at odds with al-Sistani's opinions. Al-
Sistani, in turn, did not denounce those members for that but rather condemned the 
law. Ayatollah al-Sistani asked those Shi'i members to send a letter to the UN General 
Secretary asking him to send a delegation to Iraq in early 2004 to investigate the 
possibility of organizing general elections. The letter was sent without consulting the 
head of the CPA which was then against giving the UN any significant role in Iraq. 
When the delegation came and met with Iraqi political and social figures, including 
al-Sistani, the CPA and the Association of Muslim Scholars refused the idea of 
organizing early elections. So, the delegation proposed in its report to hold the 
elections in late 2004 without suggesting, as required by al-Sistani, an alternative 
method to the CPA's caucus system. 
The Kurds in the IGC were trying to fix their demands regarding the authorities 
of the federal government, the issue of Kirkuk, and the veto of the three Kurdish 
provinces in the referendum of the permanent constitution. The marji'iyat of Najaf 
opposed giving them the claimed veto and refused their proposal to base the federal 
system on geographic-ethnic aspects. Although this contributed to omitting an ethnic 
basis for Iraqi federalism from the TAL, the Kurds managed to get the final draft to 
provide for their veto and the supremacy of the regional authority over that of the 
central government, besides founding a sectarian presidential council despite al-
Sistani's efforts. 
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The issuing of the TAL reflected a limited influence of Ayatollah al-Sistani over 
the CPA. However, the Grand Ayatollah managed to prevent the UN and the Security 
Council from recognizing the TAL. 
4. The formation of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) 
The Position of Ayatollah al-Sistani  
The bayan of the marja‘ al-Sistani emphasized that, based on the stand toward the 
TAL, the new Interim Government lacked popular legitimacy because its formation 
did not rest on an electoral process. However, the Ayatollah set forth three conditions 
to be realized by the interim government had it wanted to obtain such legitimacy: 
convincing the UN Security Council to issue a resolution that brings the power back 
to the Iraqis in all fields, providing security and services, and preparing for the 
upcoming general elections (al-Khaffaf, 2006, Doc 64). During the negotiations 
among the CPA, the UN delegation headed by Lakhdar Brahimi, and the IGC, to 
appoint the new interim Prime Minister, the marji'iyat of Najaf was occasionally 
consulted.  When they proposed nominating Ayad Allawi to the post, the Ayatollah 
Sistani stated that he "would not object if Ayad Allawi was the UN team's final 
choice" (Allawi, 2007).  
One important factor that led al-Sistani to such a conditional endorsement to the 
interim government was the emergence of the Sadrists' Mahdi Army as a dominant 
power in many Shi'i cities, including Najaf. The marji'iyat felt such a situation would 
jeopardize its leadership within the Shi'i community taking into account that those 
same armed elements were among the mobs that surrounded the four Grand 
Ayatollahs' offices in the early days of the invasion, ordering them to leave Iraq. This 
made the quick formation of the Iraqi interim government a priority for al-Sistani and 
his colleagues in Najaf because they could then support the Iraqi armed forces to 
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restore order in the holy city as they could not order the militiamen to hand over the 
city to the occupying forces. 
The UN mission 
Ayatollah al-Sistani was an advocate of giving a greater role to the UN in Iraq 
contrary to the CPA's initial plans. In the early period of 2004, the US administration 
came to conclude that such a role was essential to transfer the authority into a 
relatively legitimate Iraqi government. The Americans thus accepted the demand of 
Ayatollah al-Sistani to have the UN arbitrate the dispute over holding an early 
election. When Brahimi came to Iraq, he was faced though by a categorical rejection 
of early elections by the CPA officials and then suggested in his report to hold the 
elections in the beginning of 2004 as a middle ground between that of the CPA and al-
Sistani. This had shaken the demands of al-Sistani forcing him to give up his previous 
calls and rely on just a guaranteed free election that would lead to a constitutional 
assembly. However, the efforts of al-Sistani to get the US administration committed 
to hold this election at this date was considered by many as a victory to the marji'iyat 
as it resulted in a constitution that would be written by an elected body. 
The CPA 
The CPA had a major role in forming the IIG as it was its last procedure before 
transferring the authority and dissolving itself. By that stage, some sort of mechanism 
to communicate with the office of al-Sistani had been developed through which the 
CPA could figure out exactly what the clergy wanted. So, regular consultations about 
the governmental posts had been carried out in which the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani 
set the required characteristics for the prime minister and ministers in general without 
nominating specific personalities.  
5. The elections of the Constitutional Assembly, January 2005 
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The only statement made by al-Sistani's office in Najaf about the January 
elections was ordering the followers to register their name in the electoral records. 
However, the role of the Ayatollah extended to set up a committee of his aides, 
headed by Hussein al-Shahristani, to form the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) or the Shi'i 
list. In addition, two of his prominent Wakils, al-Safy and al-Karbala'i, were members 
in the list. This clear intervention, in addition to the emerging sectarian strife, 
reportedly led to the winning of the UIA of a majority in the elections. 
Although the UIA contained few Sunni figures, it signaled a change in the anti-
sectarian positions of the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. The step jeopardized the 
chances of the liberal Shi'i politicians, most of whom had joined Allawi's al-Iraqiya 
list, to get a considerable share in the to-be parliament in favor of the Islamist 
organizations. Had al-Sistani avoided such an intervention, the proportional 
representation system of the elections would have led to having multiple Shi'i blocs, 
none of which would have a majority, and thus to many disputes. 
In addition, Ayatollah al-Sistani's intervention in forming the UIA revealed the 
intentions behind his previous statements. When he was asked about the place of 
Islam in the constitution, he replied that as long as the constitution drafters are 
Muslims, tacitly Islamists, the document would respect the Islamist paramount 
principles. As he had helped those Islamists to reach and dominate the Constitutional 
Assembly, he would be able to convey his state-related views. 
The Shi'i rival groups 
The crisis of Najaf, the armed conflict between the Mahdi Army and the IIG, 
which broke out in August 2004, resulted in several new facts regarding the 
relationship among the rival Shi'i groups. The central role of Ayatollah al-Sistani in 
arbitrating and resolving the conflict has promoted his influence within the Shi'i arena 
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and more importantly over the Sadrist Movement. This influence forced the Shi'i 
groups, especially the ISCI, to transform their position from supporting the IIG's plan 
to attack the Najaf-based Sadrist forces into adopting a somewhat neutral stand. It 
seamed that Ayatollah al-Sistani concluded that leaving those rival Shi'i groups alone 
in the upcoming January elections would result in not only weakening of the Shi'i 
electoral powers but also threatening the security situation in the Shi'a cities and 
especially the shrine cities. Although Muqtada al-Sadr announced that his movement 
would not participate in this election, several moderate Sadrist figures were convinced 
to join the UIA list, adopting the 'peaceful resistance' agenda that tacitly was run by 
al-Sistani's marji'iyat. This marked the entering of al-Sadr under the marji'iyat's 
umbrella. 
The US authorities in Iraq 
The landslide win of the Islamist UIA in this election was a shocking reality to 
the US plans in Iraq. Their influence appeared inferior to that of al-Sistani as they had 
counted on the secular list of Ayad Allawi, which barely got 40 seats out of 275 in the 
Constitutional Assembly, much less than the 148 seats of the UIA. Many thought then 
that Ayatollah al-Sistani would impose an Islamic constitution but he actually did not.  
6. Drafting and approving the permanent Constitution 
Ayatollah al-Sistani's position 
The stage of drafting the constitution represented an opportunity to examine 
Ayatollah al-Sistani's intentions regarding the future role of Shariy'a in the new Iraqi 
state It was mentioned previously that the TAL stipulated that Islam is 'a source of 
legislation' rather than 'the main source of legislation' as required by Ayatollah al-
Sistani. These efforts contrasted with the calls for a more secularist constitution by 
some liberal politicians, especially the Kurds, and the US administration. There were 
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two dilemmas involved:  how to balance the role of Islam and that of democracy and 
the sectarian differences within Shariy'a itself. The final draft addresses these issues 
by stipulating that Islam is the official religion of the state and that no law can be 
approved that violates the commonly agreed principles of Islam. This formula was a 
response to the marji'iyat's vital concern of having a modern state that does not 
violate Islamic principles. On the other hand, it separates Shariy'a, as such, from a 
direct role in the state‘s apparatus and the practice of the legislative, administrative, 
and judicial functions of the state. 
The influence of the hawza of Najaf was clear in two other issues. The 
Constitution's introduction recognizes the marji'iyat's position in Iraq by stipulating 
that the Iraqi people practicing the democratic processes responding "to the calls of 
our religious leaderships … and our great marjas". In addition, it grants the holy 
shrines a special status according to which the state should secure and promote them.  
When asked in 2004 about the greatest danger that Iraq was facing, Ayatollah 
stated that it was the danger of suppressing the Iraqi cultural identity in which Islam 
holds the center. The outcome of the hawza's intervention or influence over the 
process of drafting the constitution has, to some extent, tackled this concern.  
Although Ayatollah al-Sistani did not issue an official announcement supporting 
the final draft, other than urging citizens to record their names in the electoral records, 
most the media indicated that the Grand Ayatollah endorsed the document depending 
on source close to the marja. 
The UIA 
Most parties of the UIA campaigned in the Shi'i cities to ratify the proposed 
constitution. The networks of the ISCI, in particular, consisting of clerics, hawza 
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students, mosques' Imams, and tribesmen, had a critical role in convincing people that 
the Ayatollah had endorsed the draft.  
It is noteworthy also that the ISCI had pursued extraordinary efforts to extend the 
principle of federalism to be applicable in other regions in Iraq and particularly in the 
Shi'i south. Although there have been some Shi'i politicians and intellectuals 
advocating establishing a region in the south, the ISCI adoption of federalism had 
some distinctions. Unlike the other advocates of Shi'i regions who generally campaign 
for three-province regions, the Middle Euphrates and the Basra-Nassiriya-Amarah 
regions, the ISCI advocated for a nine-province region extending from Basra to 
Baghdad. Bearing in mind the transnational affiliation of the organization to the 
Iranian jurist guardian, the ISCI was, as I believe, envisaging the implementation of 
the absolute guardian of jurist in the proposed Shi'i region. This has been worrying to 
many Shi'is who tend to refuse the Iranian style of theocracy due to two major factors:  
the influence of the anti-absolute guardianship Ayatollah al-Sistani and recent 
political developments in Iran itself. Hence, the ISCI's calls for the Shi'i federalist 
region have not found an echo in the Iraqi Shi'a.  
Ayatollah al-Sistani in turn has been extremely careful in his statements when 
asked about federalism in Iraq as he indicated that it is up to Iraqis to decide on the 
matter. He definitely was concerned over Iranian intentions regarding federalism in 
Iraq as the ISCI has been the closest Iraqi Shi'i organization to the Iranian 
government.  
From this case study, it is evident that al-Sistani is fully knowledgeable of the 
consequences of the positions that Ayatollahs took under the British Mandate and the 
Hashemite monarchy such as boycotting the transition initially and asking for the 
restoration of direct British control ultimately. His steps indicated that the marja‘ has 
 80 
made a thorough, pragmatic assessment of the Mandate era and, accordingly, 
envisages establishing a Shi'i civil society affiliated to a marji'iyat that oversees the 
government's policies to ensure their conformity with the Shariy'a.  
  
II. The rule of law 
1. Public order and properties 
After the fall of the Ba'ath regime, a governance vacuum emerged. Ayatollah 
Sistani issued many fatwas calling on Iraqis to respect and preserve the government 
ownership over its properties, describing them as 'the properties of the people' and 
asking his followers to return looted public property. In an announcement issued in 
April 14, 2003, the office of Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf stated that "He emphasizes the 
duty of preserving people[‗s] lives, public properties, and public order besides 
abandoning sectarian conflicts" (www.sistani.org).  
In addition, he denounced retaliation actions against ex-Ba'ath members requiring 
victims' relatives to wait until security should be restored and courts again operated 
(www.sistani.org; Allawi, 2007, 210).  
Looting struck Baghdad but other governorates did not witness such a surge. It is 
unknown whether Baghdad Shi'ite districts, where Sistani has numerous followers, 
experienced less or more looting cases than did other districts. Concerning the 
revenge-based killings against Ba'ath Party members, comparing the level of 
retaliatory actions in 2003 to those happened during the uprising of March 1991, the 
former must be seen as comparatively less widespread. This is true for the killings 
carried out by the relatives of the regime's victims as individual actions, but does not 
apply to the organized killings after the fall of Baghdad in 2003 of which the ISCI's 
Badr Brigade stands accused. This view is derived from the writer's personal 
 81 
experience as a witness to all these events. 
When Muqtada Al-Sadr installed his Islamic courts in a bid to extend his 
religious authority and to dictate public conduct (by, for example, requiring even 
Christian women to wear veils), Sistani "[i]ssued a statement saying that the Najaf 
establishment had not called for forcible veiling." (Cale, 2003, 19) In a written 
interview with the New York Times, the Ayatollah answered a question about certain 
Shariy'a-based courts in Najaf by saying that they have nothing to do with his 
marja'iyat and that they are managed by "some incompetent clerics" 
(www.sistani.org). 
On the other hand, al-Sistani's influence was limited in other areas. He prohibited, 
for instance, building houses on public lands, but shanty towns have been spreading 
rapidly in middle and southern Iraq. This may have been a matter of pressing 
economic needs especially in the poor housing sector in Iraq. 
2. Sectarian tensions 
The influence of Ayatollah al-Sistani in calming the Sunni-Shi'i tensions had 
been evident in the era prior to bombing the Samarra shrines but since then it tended 
to decline. The postwar era marked the mass bombings of the Shi'i gatherings which 
were mainly claimed by al-Qaida in Iraq and its extreme Iraqi Sunni allies. In 
addition, those organizations had controlled the roads connecting Baghdad with the 
southern shrine cities in which large numbers of Iraqi Shi'i pilgrimages were killed for 
sectarian motives. Many Shi'i factions, figures, and tribal sheikhs approached the 
hawza and particularly al-Sistani asking him to issue a fatwa permitting them to react 
to such attacks. He refused to do so ordering them to let the government deal with this 
situation within the legal framework. During this period, from April 2003 until 2005, 
Muqtada al-Sadr had maintained good relations with the Sunni rejectionists, 
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especially the Association of Muslim Scholars, a matter that kept the Mahdi Army 
away from retaliation actions. 
This exercise of Shi'i self-restraint towards these attacks reached an end when the 
holy shrine of the tenth and eleventh Imam of the Shi'a in Samarra was bombed. Al-
Sistani's statement in the occasion called the Shi'i devotes to use 'peaceful means' to 
condemn the action and ordered them to avoid any action leading to sectarian strife. 
The latter call, however, has not been binding as Shi'i armed groups swept to the 
Sunni-dominated neighborhoods pursuing a broad campaign of killings, kidnappings, 
and bombings. The vast majority of these actions were run by elements affiliated to 
the al-Mahdi Army who nonetheless seemed uncommitted to the directions of their 
leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, to avoid killing the Sunni civilians. In general, the members 
of al-Sadr's militia tended to ignore the directives of Ayatollah al-Sistani including his 
repeated calls to stop these sectarian murders. 
III. Clerics as candidates 
On April 20, 2003, about ten days after the fall of the Saddam regime, Ayatollah 
Sistani declared a fatwa that warned clerics against direct involvement in politics by 
assuming political offices. He urged them, instead, to offer general guidance to the 
public (Noorbaksh, 2008, 62; www.sistani.org). This seems contradictory to the fact 
that two leading representatives of Sistani ran and won in the first elections for the 
Constitutional Assembly in January 2005. Al-Safy and al-Karbala'i were on the Shi'ite 
list of the United Iraqi Alliance. The office of Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf justified the 
step as to ensure the conformity of the Constitution with Islamic core principles. 
It can be said that most clerics who were already involved directly in politics at 
time of the fatwa above were mainly members of the ISCI and the Da'wa party, and in 
the former in particular. The higher stratum of politicians in ISCI has mostly consisted 
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of clerics with turbans
11
. They chose to disregard the edict at the time it was issued as 
well as in the subsequent elections. Their counterparts in Al-Da'wa party also ignored 
the fatwa.  
This disregarding of al-Sistani's related fatwas is justifiable from a jurisprudence 
viewpoint. Most the senior members of the Shi'i political organizations do not emulate 
Ayatollah al-Sistani but rather follow deceased senior jurists such as al-Sadr II or 
Khomeini. A devout Shi'i could not emulate a deceased marja but he/she could 
continue emulating the source of emulation after the latter's death, especially if the 
emulator believes that the dead jurist is superior in jurisprudence to the living ones. 
Meanwhile, they must emulate a living marja in unprecedented, or new, cases about 
which the deceased jurist has no fatwa. Accordingly, many senior members in the 
ISCI are believed to emulate Ayatollah Khomeini while the junior ones emulate 
Khamane'i whereas the senior members of the Da'wa Party emulate al-Sadr II and 
some of the party's junior members follow Ayatollah Muhammad Husein Fadhlallah 
(Lebanon). Sadrists, in turn, emulate al-Sadr I.  
This privilege is applied on the personal level. Thus, the party as a whole could 
not continue considering its previous marja as the current jurist of the party but must 
follow a living one. 
The actual religious effect of the Ayatollah al-Sistani's fatwa was mainly on 
preventing some ambitious clerics in the Hawza of Najaf from joining those two 
Shi'ite parties, ISCI and Al-Da'wa. In addition, these fatwas must be applied, in 
theory, on those junior members in the ISCI who emulate Khamana'i because the 
latter's learning level is below that of Ayatollah al-Sistani by any standard. However, 
as was early explained, the theory of Khomeini about the absolute guardianship of the 
jurist violated this established doctrinal principle by granting the Jurist Guardian the 
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supreme religious authority binding on all aspects of life even if that Jurist is well 
below the others in terms of academic learning. 
 
Prospects for the conflict between al-Sistani's neo-quietist approach and 
Khamana'i's Walayat al-Faqih 
Behind the scene in the Shi'i arena in Iraq and the Middle East there is a struggle 
between two theories regarding the relationship between the state and jurists. The 
Iranian Supreme Leader represents the absolute guardianship of the jurist theory while 
Ayatollah al-Sistani is the major representative of the opposite theory advocating a 
'neo-quietist' approach and the partial guardianship of the jurist.  
Economically, the Khamana'i faction has control over the huge resources of the 
Iranian state and a transnational network of seminaries, mosques, charities, and other 
kinds of socioeconomic institutions, whereas Ayatollah al-Sistani is dependent on the 
Khums revenues beside his own transnational religious network of institutions. 
In Iraq, many factors will shape the outcome of this unannounced conflict. One 
important factor is the very same struggle to build a stable, united, and prosperous 
Iraqi state, a condition that would jeopardize the Iranian plan of having decisive 
influence in Iraq and would suppress the ISCI's project of establishing a pro-
Khamana'i federation in southern and middle Iraq. ISCI's leaders stopped talking 
about their Middle and South Region after their defeat in the 2009 provincial 
elections, at which time the party conducted a comprehensive reassessment to its 
agenda, but, as usual, the results of this significant internal dialog have not been 
declared.  
Concerning this political revision, one may put forward two competing 
hypotheses.  First, it can be argued that the ISCI has shelved the federation project 
until friendly environment emerges, i.e., they may try to revisit the plan later on if the 
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security situation in Iraq deteriorates to the extent that the Shi'i community becomes 
more convinced of the project. The project falls in the center of their strategy which 
envisages realizing their old-new mission of the Islamic state even within a federation 
in Iraq. It is hard to say that such a plan has nothing to do with the Iranian regime, as 
the ISCI is known to be Iran's main proxy in Iraq.  
The second possibility is that the reassessment mentioned above has led the 
ISCI's leaders to adopt a more holistic and pragmatic approach regarding core issues 
such as the relationship with Iran, Walayat al-faqih, and the Arab identity of Iraq. 
Some strategic adjustment may have been adopted in some of these areas, but if so 
such an adjustments' impact on practice would be gradual and take much time to be 
noticed. The results of the last public elections of 2010's showed another substantial 
loss in ISCI's share in parliament (from 35 seats out of 275 in the previous parliament 
to only 17 out of the 325 seats in the current one). This would further urge this party 
to modify its manifesto, perhaps moving further away from Khamana'i and closer to 
al-Sistani's way of thinking. In that case, Iran could well shift its current support for 
the ISCI to the latter's rival; Muqtada al-Sadr and his followers.  This, I think, is 
exactly what makes ISCI's leaders reluctant to announce any basic adjustment in its 
walayat al-faqih agenda. 
The struggle between al-Sistani and Khamana'i to influence the Iraqi Shi'i parties 
is vital to determining the ultimate winner of the whole doctrinal confrontation. In this 
regard, the Iranian Jurist Guardian relies on his regime's capability in maneuvering 
and mobilizing huge resources that enable him to act as a major moderator in these 
parties‘ struggle for power and hegemony in Iraq. Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani seems to 
depend, in this regard, on the gradual development of the political process in Iraq over 
which he has a strong influence. So, he is presumably relying on elections as a tool to 
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keep the Shi'i parties from adopting the agenda of the Iranian government and its 
ideology because, as said by Max Weber, state and politics are the most effective 
tools of secularization.  Thus, these parties' involvement in politics would encourage 
them to gradually abandon their universalistic ideology of the absolute guardianship 
of the jurist and to focus more on bread and butter politics.  
Another determinant of the competition between al-Sistani and Khamana'i is the 
usage of the transnational religious networks. In this regard, there are three major 
networks. In addition to Khamana'i's networks, there are al-Khoei Foundation and the 
informal network of al-Sistani himself. The latter two are already allied, to some 
extent, because al-Khoei's sons, the foundation's administrators, are said to have 
supported the supremacy of al-Sistani over other marjas in Najaf in the 1990s, while 
Ayatollah al-Sistani confirmed their continuity in managing the foundation. The 
foundation is known for its anti-walayat al-faqih position and the hostility between it 
and the Iranian Islamic regime is well-known as well. Taking into account the worldly 
activities of the al-Khoei foundation, its role in promoting the quietist marji'iya in the 
Shi'i world is critical, especially if these efforts were coupled with additional support 
deriving from the emerging popularity of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. 
Taking into account al-Sistani‘s advanced age, one must recognize that al-
Sistani's death or disability would pose a threat to the traditional Shi'i marji'iya and 
the orthodox doctrine of the jurist's partial guardianship in favor of that of the 
absolute guardianship and Khamana'i's marji'iya. Such a situation would likely move 
the Shi'i supreme marji'iya into Qum due the organizational and academic weakness 
of the other Najaf-based marjas. However, the influence of al-Khoei Foundation and 
that of al-Sistani‘s network should be decisive in determining the next marja. Insuring 
a quietist marja in the position of Najaf supreme marja would be critical to preserving 
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al-Sistani's school of thought but Khamana'i would heavily intervene in this 
contention. One probable action of the Iranian Jurist Guardian would be urging 
Ayatollah Kadhem al-Ha'iri, the Sadrist's previous jurist and a disciple of al-Sadr I, to 
move back to Najaf and promoting his supremacy in its Hawza. This Ayatollah has 
been very close to the Iranian regime as explained previously. However, this 
emergence would be resisted for the quietist orientation of Najaf Hawza.  
Although such a situation will be quite unpredictable, those Najafi clerics who 
oppose the Khomaini style of governance, whose number is considerable, would 
struggle to secure the sufficient number of academic recommendations required to 
raise their preferred candidate to the level of supremacy. In that quest, the potential 
role of al-Khoei Foundation and al-Sistani's network would be vital as they would 
provide the necessary financial and organizational support for that class of clerics to 
prevail and thus to block moves to establish jurist guardianship in Iraq. 
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End Notes 
                                                
(1) Ahl al hal wa al-aqd is a group of devoted, wise, just, and leading figures of a Muslim community 
(el-Sousi et al, 2005) 
(2) The founders of the Saudi state had launched several military campaign against Najaf and Karbala 
in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. 
(3) The fatwa reads: "the use of tobacco is haraam [forbidden] now, and considered as confronting the 
Imam of the time [al-Mahdi]." (el-Labbad, 2005, 47) 
(4) The three marjas, among others, have been politically and economically pressed by the regime 
when Khamanei was appointed as the Supreme Leader in 1989 to recognize him as an Ayatollah 
but they, though, called him in their separate congratulating letters only Hujjat el-Islam wal-
Muslimeen (el-Labbad, 2005). 
(5) In 1993, Ayatollah Mishkini, a pro-regime jurist, handed the Qumi marjas a letter signed by several 
pro-government clerics ordering them to recognize Khamanei's religious leadership. They 
responded aggressively accusing those who signed the letter of being fuqahaa' al-sulta, the jurists of 
the regime, and condeming the attempt describing it as an 'unprecedented action' in the history of 
Hawzas (el-Labbad). 
(6) This equates to one=-fifth of a person‘s goods and money calculated on an annual basis after a fixed 
allowance for living expenses is deducted. 
(7) The revolution was brutally oppressed by British forces that used "blanket bombing of villages as 
the original 'shock and awe' doctrine, which eight decades later the US military adopted." (Ismael & 
Ismael, 2005, 611). 
(8) Sistani's son-in-law Jawad Shahrestani has made outstanding efforts to extend his father-in-law‘s 
popularity in Qum seminary through the Al-Bayt Institute for Revival of Shi'ite Heritage. Located 
in Qum, this foundation has the ultimate objective of not only publishing religious books and old 
manuscripts, but also spreading the name of Sistani in the competitive climate of Qum. These 
attempts to promote Sistani's name were resisted because "When Qom‘s influential clerics figured 
out that Sistani was trying to present himself as a marja, they campaigned against him." Eventually, 
Shahrestani managed to overcome these campaigns by his "wise and diplomatic measures" (Khaliji, 
2006, 8). There are two factions that prepared the religious Shi'ite communities to accept the 
marja’iyat of Sistani, one in Najaf and one in Qum, which represent the two main seminaries in 
modern Shi'a Islam. 
(9) "This huge foundation is represented and operated by thousands of wakils, or officially approved 
agents, around the world. The wakil system is a complex network of agents who interact on a daily 
basis via phone and the Internet to monitor and administer the ayatollah‘s financial infrastructure. 
Sistani‘s network comprises thousands of members and activists who operate a vast network of 
social services—ranging from schools (madrasas) to pious endowments, from hospitals to 
libraries—and who interact to administer his funds and represent his views in a number of cities 
around the world." (Rahimi, 2007, 6) 
(10)  The Article 61c in the TAL mentions that "if three provinces vote against the constitution in the 
national referendum by two thirds or more, the draft will not be adopted." (Papagiani, 2007) this 
article was transferred into the Constitution approved in October 2005. 
(11) It is customary for a student in a hawza to wear a turban especially after the preliminaries.  The 
turban should be white, and the student is then called Shaykh, except for those descended from the 
Hashimite clan, to which the Prophet and his cousin Ali belong, who wear black turbans and are 
called Sayyid, literally Sir (Sindawi, 2007). It is usual also that the higher the learning level a cleric 
reaches, the larger his turban is likely to be. 
